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Controlling the Artful Con:
Authentication and Regulation
By LEONARD D. Du BOFF*
Introduction
IN appraising art, the signature affixed,1 the period of creation, and
the expert's determination of authenticity are inextricably interwoven
with the aesthetic appeal.' Perception of the artistic merits of a piece is
also affected by these factors. Consequently, the discovery and disclo-
sure that a once-accepted original is actually a copy or forgery creates
confusion; 2 the market value plummets and critics pan once lauded
works.3
An estimated 14 to 10 percent5 of all art transactions involve
forgeries or fakes. While the percentage may seem small, the amount of
money involved is impressive. 6 It has been suggested that every new art
collection contains at least one fake; some collections contain little else.7
* B.E.S., 1968, Hofstra University; J.D., 1971, Brooklyn Law School. Associate
Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark College; President, Oregon Volunteer Lawyers for
the Arts, Inc.; Chairman, AALS Section on Law and the Arts. The author wishes to
recognize the valuable assistance of Carol Johnstone, member, third year class, Lewis
and Clark Law School, and Mary Ann Crawford Du Boff, Executive Secretary, Oregon
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc.
o 1976, Leonard D. Du Boff.
1. There is a tale that Pablo Picasso signed a napkin and gave it to a poor friend,
admonishing him not to sell it too cheaply. S. BURNHAM, THE ART CRown 87 (1973).
2. See generally S. KEcK, ART: AtrrHamc Akm FAKE (1967).
3. An example is the Etruscan Horse incident discussed in notes 27-28 infra.
4. L. JEPPsoN, THE FABuLous FAutDs 290 (1970).
5. See generally R. ARis, LES FAUX VANS LA PEINTURE ET L'EXPERTISE SCIEN-
TIpiQUE38 (1965).
6. See Note, Uniform Commerical Code Warranty Solutions to Art Fraud and
Forgery, 14 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 409 (1972). Total sales in the art market annually
reach $300 to $400 million. Id. See also Hodes, "Fake" Art and the Law, 27 FED.
B.J. 73 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Fake Art]. It is impossible accurately to state an
annual figure for art transactions, since the so-called art market is spread all over the
world, and many sales go unreported.
7. See, e.g., Boss Embroiled, NEwswEEK, Feb. 19, 1968, at 87; Fake or lake,
id., May 22, 1967, at 87; Meadow's Luck, TiME, May 19, 1967, at 94.
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While forgery has been practiced for centuries,8 today it has
reached epidemic proportions.9 Perhaps the increase in art frauds can
be traced to the emergence of art as an investment vehicle. Art is
viewed by some as a financial panacea, a viable alternative to the
traditional forms of investment. 10
This article will explore some of the problems presented by forger-
ies, examine methods currently available for their detection, and analyze
existing legislation. Several proposals will be presented which, if imple-
mented, should result in greater protection for the art purchaser and a
reduction in the quantity of forgeries currently masquerading as authen-
tic works of art.
Defining the Problem
Before examining methods of authentication, it is worthwhile to
consider what constitutes a forgery and who is responsible for it in each
instance. To facilitate the discussion, forgeries will be divided into
three general categories:
(1) Works deliberately created to be sold -as the product of
another artist. Activities involved include forgery of an
artist's name, falsification of documents of authentication and
forgery of the entire work;
(2) Exact replicas or other innocently-created pieces which
are sold as originals; this group encompasses pieces executed
"in the style of' a famous artist which are later sold as the
work of the master; and
(3) Works changed by the artist to enhance value or salabil-
8. FOGG MUSEUM OF ART, ART: GENuINE OR CouNtERltrr? 8 (1949) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Foco].
9. Cf. Hodes, Wanted: Art Legislation for Illinois, 57 ILL. B.J. 218 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Art Legislation].
10. Bender, The Boom in Art for Corporate Use, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1973, § 3,
at 3, col. 1. But see Goetze, Antique Collectors Cautioned by Couple about 'Investment'
Purchases, Oregonian, May 6, 1974, § 3, at 9, col. 1; Saxon, Anyone Here Want to Buy a
Rubens?, EsQUmE, Jan. 1971, at 58. One interesting question raised by this new concept
is whether the art investor may be able to take advantage of the federal laws which
regulate the securities market. See 236 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP., Jan. 23, 1974, at c-4
(importer of commemorative plates was not required to file registration statement
pursuant to Securities Act of 1933). But see SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Dist., Ltd., 388
F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (portfolio of rare coins was a security for purposes of
registration requirements of 1933 act). Another question which may arise in the future
is whether rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 will be available for
the defrauded art purchaser. Cf. SEC v. M.A. Lundy Associates, 362 F. Supp. 226
(D.R.I. 1973).
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ity. Such changes include embellishments, fragmentation of
oversized piece completion of unfinished works, and excessive
restoration."
Some colorful examples of the first category, deliberate fabrica-
tions, may provide insight into the scope of the problem. One imitator
used the pastiche method to forge a Holbein. The hands of one
original Holbein were combined with the head and shoulders of another
original to create the fake. The pastiche passed as an original until an
art historian revealed the deception.12  A second example is the work of
Van Megeeren, whose successful career as a forger of Vermeers was
halted only when he himself disclosed the fraud to escape prosecution
for aiding the enemy during World War 11.13 The art world, shaken by
the news, refused to accept the fact until Van Meegeren created another
masterpiece in his jail cell.14
Not only do forgers copy past masters, but some have attempted to
imitate famous contemporaries as well. Recently, David Stein adopted
the styles of noted artists,' 5 forged their signatures to forty-one paint-
ings and sold them for a total of $168,000.16 The reward for his skill
was a two and a half to five year sentence in a French jail.' 7  While
confined, Stein was permitted to continue painting in the style of Cha-
gall, Miro, Matisse and Picasso provided the creations bore the signature
"Stein, D." rather than the simulated signatures of the renowned mas-
ters.18  In 1969, the London affiliate of the Wright Hepburn Webster
Gallery of New York exhibited a collection of Stein forgeries. 9 Half of
these were sold on opening night .2  The following year, the Gallery in
New York advertised the exhibition of sixty-eight Stein paintings by
placing a notice in the window which read, "Forgeries by Stein."' The
11. Similar classifications are suggested in Fogg, supra note 8, and Fake Art, supra
note 6.
12. VAN DA 4TZIG, TRhuE oR FALS E 24 (1953) [hereinafter cited as VAN DANTzG].
13. Id. at 25.
14. Id. See also Stross, Chemistry Digs the Past, 32 THE VORTEX 105.
15. Stein's skill is extraordinary. He can paint in the style of Picasso, Chagall,
Miro and Matisse. See generally A. STEIN, TINEE PiCASSOs BEsoRE B rEKFAsr (1973)
[hereinafter cited as STEIN].
16. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1969, at 30, col. 5. But see id., Apr. 30, 1969,
at 44, col. 4, (Stein forgeries cost collectors about $1 million).
17. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 19'69, at 30, col. 5. ,
18. State v. Wright Hepburn Webster Gallery, Ltd., 64 Misc. 2d 423, 424, 314
N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1970), affd 37 App. Div. 2d 698, 323 N.Y.S.2d 389
(1971).
19. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1969, at 44, col. 4.
20. Id.
21. 64 Misc. 2d at 424, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
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show drew tremendous crowds who paid high prices.22 The New York
Attorney General sought an injunction to prevent this sale.23 It was
alleged that the Stein paintings were so like the works of the masters
whose styles he appropriated that an unscrupulous person could easily
remove Stein's name, replace it with that of the artist whose style was
imitated and flood the market with a new tide of forgeries.24  The court
rejected this argument and held that the possibility of an intervening
forger removing Stein's name and replacing it with a known master's
was an insufficient basis for granting an injunction.25
The New York court apparently ignored the fact that many forger-
ies are initially created as innocent copies. It is only after someone has
doctored a work and passed it off as an original masterpiece that it
becomes a forgery; it then fits within the second category of counterfeits.
The possibility of such a development is not remote; yet the court
apparently felt that it would be unjust to inhibit these legitimate sales
merely because some unscrupulous person might be tempted to change a
work's attribution.
Giovanni Bastianini, an eighteenth century artist, sculpted a bust
inscribed with the name of a poet, Girolamo Benivieni, which soon was
praised as an authentic Quattrocento work. Bastianini, innocent of -the
misrepresentation, received a mere 330 francs for the very work which
the Louvre later paid 14,000 francs to acquire.2 6 The reluctance of the
museum to believe Bastianini's claims of authorship and the later sale of
the bust as an original raises some question about the importance
traditionally attributed to authenticity.17
22. Cf. id.
23. Id. at 423, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
24. Id. at 424, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
25. Id. at 429, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
26. FoGG, supra note 8, at 12.
27. Perhaps the recent controversy over the New York Metropolitan Museum's
Greek Horse best illustrates this point. In 1967, following a six-year probe, a
museum director, J. V. Noble, alleged that the Greek statue thought to be 2,400 years old
was of more recent origin. Esterow, Metropolitan Finds Its Greek Horse a Fake, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1967, at 1, col. 2. See also Shepard, Tarnished Horse Shines at
Museum, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1967, at 58, col. 1, in which it is noted that the display of
the allegedly fraudulent bronze took the spotlight away from the museum's authentic
antiquities. Ironically, the popularity of the forgery created a brisk trade in reproduc-
tions of the horse for $75 a piece at Brentano's bookstore in New York. Id. Mr. Noble
contended that the bronze was cast in sand, a method not developed until the fourteenth
century. Shirey, Metropolitan Bronze Horse Proves to Be Ancient, N.Y. Times, Dec.
24, 1972, at 33, col. 1. The museum removed this once revered piece from its display
and consigned it to storage. Curiously, this bronze, which had been previously cited as
one of the finest examples of classic Greek craftsmanship, was suddenly criticized as
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Creations of students working under the supervision of a recog-
nized artist are also included in the second category. Some of these
pieces have become confused with the works of the supervising master. 8
For years, Odalisque en Grisaille, admired by many, was attributed to
Ingres. In a recent reattribution proceeding at the Metropolitan Mu-
seum, the authorship of the work was placed in doubt. A museum
expert attributed the work to Ingres's assistant, Armand Cambon, and
sent the painting to the Wildenstein Gallery in Paris for further analysis.
The painting is back on display at the Metropolitan with the
attribution changed to Cambon, although a few scholars still believe it to
be Ingres's work.29 It is conjectured that the painting has depreciated
from its previous worth of between $750,000 and $1,000,000 to a mere
$100,000.80 Yet it is the same painting that has been critically ap-
praised and technically described for years. The value of the art object,
supposedly inherent, appears to have dwindled suddenly. The question
necessarily arises whether the art objectfs value is innate or whether it is
dependent on the identity of the artist.
It is impossible to determine the precise amount of work a student
must perform under a recognized master before the creation becomes
part of the master's "school." Consider, for example, the many appren-
tices of the Rembrandt School who worked not only under Rembrandts
direction but also with him on some creations.31 If it is disclosed that
some of the paintings of Gerard Dou are incorrectly attributed to
Rembrandt, these pieces might well be cast off as forgeries of the
category two variety.32  These once-revered works could then be expect-
ed to fare poorly in a subsequent reappraisal.
inferior. The following year, a panel of art scholars concluded that Nobles findings
were erroneous. Further scientific study of radiographs and x-ray photographs led the
panel to decide that the horse was "an irrefutably genuine work of antiquity." Id. The
Metropolitan Museum officials have restored the horse to its former place of honor and
once again it is the subject of scholarly acclaim.
28. VAN DAN=zGO, supra note 12, at 24.
29. Hess, Metropolitan Finds "Odalisque" Not by Ingres; Will Rehang Painting
With a New Attribution, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1973, at 24, col. 1.
30. See VAN DANmG, supra note 12. See also N.Y. Times, Ian. 31, 1973, at 26,
col. 2.
31. E. MicH.L, R mmANDT 46 (2d ed. 1895).
32. Perhaps the term "forgery" is too harsh in some circumstances. If, for
example, the misattribution resulted from an honest error, the piece should not be
condemned as a forgery. If, on the other hand, the misattribution was intentional, a
fraud has been perpetrated. The result in either situation is the same from the
purchaser's point of view; namely, that he has paid for a Renoir and received a Dou. In
the former instance, since there was no intent to defraud, the sole remedy should be
rescission. See note 162 infra. In the latter, scienter was present, and the perpetrator of
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The works of students may be mistaken for those of their student
colleagues as well as for those of their masters.13  A particular local
influence prompted two seventeenth century artists, Abraham Storck
and Adam Silo, to depict the activity of ships. Both paintings were
entitled River Scene and signed A.S., which led to inevitable confu-
sion. 4 It seems unjustified to regard one as an original and the other as
a forgery when in fact they are independent but contemporaneous
creations of similar subject matter. Yet if one of these artists became
more famous than the other, it is likely that the lesser-known painter's
work would be misattributed to his better-known colleague.
Direct copies of known artists by contemporary or later artists may
also fall within the second category.35 Innocent reproductions created
as admitted copies are designated forgeries only if someone sells them as
originals. 8
Collaborative efforts may also come within the scope of this catego-
ry. Richard Guino, a sculptor, worked with Auguste Renoir to create
several sculptures. After Renoir's death, his heirs refused to pay Guino
for his part in the production. A suit was commenced against Renoir's
heirs to establish Guino's coauthorship. The defendants alleged that
the works belonged
undividedly to Renoir, the sole inspirer, the seeing guide, as Renoir
can only be All Renoir, as Rubens is All Rubens. .... 37
Only after comparing the works in question with the collaborative
products of Renoir and other sculptors did the French court declare
Guino to be a coauthor. 8 Presumably, the sculptures had been held
out to be the work of Renoir.
The third category consists of those works of art which have been
subsequently altered by an individual other than the artist for the
purpose of increasing their saleability. Many of these changes were
the wrong should be subject to penal sanctions as well as punitive damages. See text
accompanying notes 115-218 infra.
33. VAN DANTZIO, supra note 12, at 24.
34. Id. at 42.
35. If created with the intent to deceive the public, the work slips into category
one and deserves the forgery label.
36. Cf. State v. Wright Hepburn Webster Gallery, Ltd., 64 Misc. 2d 423, 424, 314
N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd 37 App. Div. 2d 698, 323 N.Y.S.2d 389
(1971).
37. Guino v. Consorts Renoir [1971] Gazette du Palais I. 235, [1971] La Semaine
Juridique II. 16697 (Decision of Tribunal, Jan. 11, 1971, affirmed by Appellate Tribu-
nal).
38. Id.
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made in the Renaissance and earlier periods when it was thought
necessary for all art to reflect contemporary ideological philosophy or
acceptable religious beliefs. 39 This type of modification of the artist's
original work is no longer a common practice. Nonetheless, an individ-
ual may alter a piece to suit some personal penchant. If a work is
resold in an altered condition, it is likely to be mistaken for the artist's
actual creation. In this instance, an authentic piece might inadvertently
be converted into a forgery.
Another classic example of art which has been condemned as
counterfeit or semi-counterfeit is an excessively overpainted or restored
piece. 0 If an art restorer merely repairs a work for conservation
purposes, the activity is praised even though it is no longer solely the
creation of the artist.41 The restorer may, however, go too far and add
so much of his own work that it would be unrealistic to say the piece
was still that of the original artist.42  This possibility exists even when
the restorer makes every effort to preserve the integrity of the work.
Another form of forgery within category three is known as frag-
mentation. In this procedure, an individual subdivides a single work
into smaller works. While the sections were actually created by the
artist to whom they are attributed, they are merely part of the composi-
tion. The pieces do not truly represent the gestalt of the artist's crea-
tion.
Although it is necessary for purposes of imposing liability to
determine what the author intended and at what point the misrepresen-
tation occurred, the only matter of true concern to the viewing or
purchasing public is whether the work purports to be something other
39. F. ARNAU, ART OF Tmr FAKER 18 (1961). ' An interesting example of the
restorer "improving" upon the aesthetic balance of a picture occurred with the The
Misses Payne, created by Sir Joshua Reynolds. When this 18th century painting was
"restored," one of the figures in the scene was deleted, since it "disturbed the smooth
harmony of the work." Id. (illustrations 33 & 34).
During the Ch'ing dynasty it was common for Chinese craftsmen to take fragments
of older pieces and work them into a new composition. These items were frequently
created in an earlier style. See 1 THm FREER GALLERY OF ART: CHlNA 176 (1972)
(description of 16th century incense burner which was altered during Ch'ing period).
40. See note 39 supra.
41. See Saving "The Night Watch", NnwswEE_, Sept. 29, 1975, at 83. One article
discusses the repair of Michelangelo's Pieta after it was defaced in Italy in 1972 and the
restoration process which will be used to repair Rembrandt's Night Watch, slashed 13
times by a mentally unbalanced person in Holland. The restoration of Night Watch is
intended to recreate the artist's original work rather than modify it. Authorities are so
confident of achieving this result that the work is to be done behind a glass partition in
full view of the public. Id.
42. See note 39 supra.
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than what it actually is. The deception exists regardless of who is
responsible for it.
The Art Experts and Methods of
Establishing Authenticity
Self-help
The purchaser can take many precautions to reduce the likelihood
of acquiring a counterfeit. Familiarity with the artist's style, period,
and peculiarities is essential. Valuable knowledge can be gained by
viewing disclosed forgeries or copies juxtaposed with the authenticated
pieces which they attempt to duplicate.43 Careful questioning of the
seller is another important precaution.44
If the artist is living, the best means of establishing authenticity is
to observe the work being created. This opportunity is, of course,
exceedingly rare and of no use in a subsequent sale. To protect himself,
the purchaser should require a certificate of authenticity45 and a bill of
sale. These documents should accompany the creation when it is sold
or transferred.46
The Experts
When the artist is no longer living, the purchaser must resort to the
scholarly expertise of the art historian for a determination of the work's
authorship or to the advanced techniques of the scientist for verification
of its age and material. The scientific methods are objective and the
results can be reproduced by other scientists in order to test their
accuracy. Stylistic authentication, on the other hand, is subjective. The
43. FoGo, supra note 8, at 6.
44. A list of suggested questions has been formulated by the Art Committee of the
Bar of the City of New York. See Committee on Art, Legal Problems of Art
Authentication, 21 REv. Ass'N B.N.Y. 96 (1966).
45. The certificate of authenticity should include: the name of the artist, the title
of the work, the date and place of completion, a description of the subject, the materials
and media used, rights reserved by the artist, if any, and the artist's signature warranting
the piece's genuineness. Artists are beginning to reserve moral and economic rights in
the works they convey. In the United States these rights should be spelled out in the
certificate. See Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the "Droit de Suite" and a
Proposed Enactment for the United States, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 19 (1966); Treece,
American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 487
(1968). See generally ART LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL (L. Du Boff ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as ART LAw]. If the work is purchased from a dealer and it is
impossible to obtain the artist's signature, the seller may give the warranty.
46. Lane, Lawyer Finds Public Needs Protection, 2 TRuL 36 (1966).
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expert views the piece in question and, based on his knowledge, intui-
tion, and experience, makes a determination. The results of subjective
authentication may vary from expert to expert.
The difference between these two methods of determining authen-
ticity occasionally creates insoluble controversies. When the stylistic
opinion rendered by an expert is in conflict with the scientific evidence,
which should prevail? The resolution of this type of dilemma may be
impossible, since forgers devote much of their skill to deceiving both
types of experts.
The vast majority of tests are valuable in eliminating forgeries
rather than precisely identifying a piece. Even scientific results are
subject to some error, albeit de minimis. Inaccuracy varies with the
material, age, region in which the piece was found, and numerous other
factors. Accordingly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have a newly
discovered item conclusively identified and authenticated. It is more
common for experts to say that based on the accumulated data, a work
is most likely to have been created in a particular period by a particular
artist.
Few art experts are available to the public, and some of those who
are may not be entirely scrupulous. This fact may cause some art
purchasers to forego the services of an art expert and, instead, rely on
some lesser authority, their own superficial knowledge, or the seller's
allegations.
A sanctuary for those who seek honest evaluation might appear to
be the museum. Unfortunately, many curators are forbidden by their
employers from giving opinions to outsiders.4 Museums wish to avoid
becoming embroiled in costly and time-consuming controversies. They
fear the prospect of having a questionable piece sell as authentic because
47. See, e.g., Easby & Colin, The Legal Aspects of Forgery and the Protection of
the Expert, MFaTOPOLITAN MusEt m OF APT BULL., Feb. 1968, at 260 [hereinafter cited
as Easby & Colin] (oral opinions may be given, while written statements are forbidden
by many institutions). But see Request for Opinion from Museum, reproduced in F.
Far LmsN & S. WkrL, ART WoRKs: LAw, Pouicy, PRAcrncE 1009 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as FELDmAN & WEL] (allowing both oral and written opinions); Address by Willis
K. Woods, Director, Seattle Art Museum, Portland, Oregon, Jan. 25, 1975 (discussing
authentication service). See also Association of Art Museum Directors, Code of Ethics
(1966, as revised, 1972). The Code of Ethics states:
"[lit should be unprofessional for a Museum Director...
"(B) to give, for a fee or on a retainer any certificate or statement as to the
authenticity or authorship of a work of art, or any statement of the monetary value of a
work of art, except where authorized by and in accordance *ith the lawful purposes of
his own or other non-profit institutions concerned or government agencies."
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it bears their endorsement. The possibility of conflict of interest is an
additional problem. A museum employee might find himself in the
untenable position of expert for both a dealer and his institution on an
object the museum wishes to acquire.
48
Once an expert is located, he may be reluctant to render an opinion
for fear of injuring his reputation if the pronouncement is later shown to
be inaccurate. Many refuse to contradict incorrect reports of other
experts even when the error is blatant. Their reticience may result from
a fear of litigation or from a hope that others might similarly overlook
their mistakes. It should be borne in mind that the credibility of a
report is directly related to the reputation of its author; a young expert
who challenges the establishment may find that he is henceforth an
outcast.
Loss of credibility is a threat to which the art expert is particularly
vulnerable. Porcella v. Time, Inc.4 9 concerned this very issue. Time
magazine published an expose of the plaintiff art expert's work. The
article suggested that the plaintiff had been authenticating an astonish-
ing number of masterpieces. It also hinted that there had been some
collusion between the plaintiff and an auction gallery. The court stated
that the article was a "satirical recital by an author who made no effort
to conceal his belief that there were some authenticators of paintings less
reliable than others." 50 It held that the recital was merely fair comment
on an item of public interest and was therefore not actionable.
The expert who renders an unfavorable opinion may be subjecting
himself to liability for slander of title. In Hahn v. Duveen,51 an art
expert, Duveen, who was in the habit of making off-the-cuff remarks
about the authenticity of paintings, generally discrediting them, stated
that the plaintiffs painting, La Belle Ferroniere, was not authentic.
Duveen was convinced that the piece was a fake, notwithstanding the
fact that he had never personally examined the picture itself. The
owner, Hahn, was upset because Deveen's statement to a New York
World reporter caused sales negotiations for the picture to be suspended.
48. This situation is particularly conducive to fraud and should be avoided. The
museum community has recently become concerned about the role of trustees, directors,
and other employees. The American Association of Museums and the American Law
Institute of the American Bar Association jointly sponsor an annual program which
analyzes the duties and liabilities of museum personnel as well as other legal problems
encountered by museums. See ALI/ABA-AAM, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUMS 1
(1973), 2 (1974), & 3 (1975).
49. 300 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962).
50. Id. at 166.
51. 133 Misc. 871, 234 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
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Hahn felt that any future sale would be affected by the unfavorable
comment.
After fourteen hours of deliberation without reaching a verdict, the
jury was discharged and the case was restored to the general calendar.
It was never retried; Duveen accepted a settlement of $60,000.52
In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action, the trial judge discussed the potential liability of an art
expert. While the opinion in Hahn has been criticized for its extensive
discussion of the facts upon which the expert's opinion was based,53 it
rocked the art world and instilled fear in art experts over their potential
liability. This reaction seems unjustified. Duveen was a stylistic expert
who had never viewed the piece in question. Because his conduct was
less than professional, there was little merit to his fair comment defense.
Since Hahn, the fair comment defense has been broadened. 54 Yet even
today, it is submitted, an unprofessional damaging opinion should be
actionable. 5 Duveen also claimed that his statement was made without
intent to disparage, as an innocent comment, and thus lacked the
requisite scienter" for slander of title.
52. See Stebbins, Possible Tort Liability for Opinions Given by Art Experts, in
FELDMAN & WErL, supra note 47, at 996.
53. See id. at 990.
54. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). See also W. PROSSER, LAW
OF ToRTs 118 (4th ed. 1971). See also Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v.
Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J
777 (1975).
55. Cf. Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 129 A.2d 149 (1957). In Walker,
the court held that assuming a mayor had a conditional privilege to make allegedly
disparaging statements by virtue of his office, this privilege was not absolute. Therefore,
an artist had stated a cause of action against the mayor who had caused the work to be
removed from a museum because it was allegedly obscene. Id.
56. The state of mind necessary to sustain disparagement charges is currently
being debated. The Restatement embraces the idea that no actual malice is required.
R.EsTATmENT OF TORTS § 626 (1938). The late Dean Prosser, however, felt. that
negligence should be sufficient, when the negligence consists of a lack of reasonable
grounds for the opinion expressed. See W. PRoSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 128 (4th ed.
1971). Apparently Dean Prosser would have preferred a rule requiring more caution on
the part of the expert. According to Professor Stebbins, however:
"In demanding proof of ill intent, Prosser follows the other economic torts too
closely; intent is easier to prove where a line of overt conduct may be shown than in the
typical disparagement case, where a single statement may be involved.
"At the other extreme, the First Restatement rule gives too much protection and
puts all speakers at their peril. Acceptance of that rule by the courts could only curb all
opinion-giving by experts. The compromise rule gives protection against irresponsible
statements but allows freedom of speech for anyone with good reason to believe his
statements." Stebbins, Possible Tort Liability for Opinions Given by Art Experts in
FELDmAN & WErL, supra note 47, at 988.
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One interesting question raised by Hahn is whether derogatory
comments directed at the work of a living artist would be sufficient to
allow recovery for defamation. In a case involving an article which
criticized a painter,57 the court said:
[N]othing can be said to be libelous of a man in his profession
except something which degrades or lowers him in his professional
character generally, and it is not a libel of one in that regard to
say that, in any particular work, he has fallen below the proper
standard or has made a failure. 58
In response to apparent pressure from art experts fearing litigation,
New York State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz caused a bill59 to
be introduced into the state legislature which would have granted a
"qualified privilege' or immunity from suits for accredited experts who
evaluate art.60 The immunity would have protected an expert who
declared a work to be a forgery if it subsequently appeared that he had
been in error. 1 In contrast, there would have been no presumption of
good faith if the authenticator pronounced a work to be genuine and it
was later disclosed that the determination had been wrong. Thus,
liability might still have been imposed with respect to the latter category
because of the possibility of collusion between the art dealer and the
examiner." It was anticipated that this statute would encourage more
experts to give opinions on the legitimacy of works of questionable
57. Battersby v. Collier, 34 App. Div. 347, 54 N.Y.S. 363 (1898).
58. Id. at 354, 54 N.Y.S. at 368. See also Outcault v. New York Herald Co., 117
App. Div. 534, 102 N.Y.S. 685 (1907).
59. Print 5734, Intro. 4818, introduced May 11, 1966 by the Committee on Rules
as a study bill entitled "An Act To Amend the General Business Law, in relation to
providing for the accrediting of fine arts experts, museums, colleges and universities for
opinions relating to authenticity of works of fine art, and making an appropriation
therefore." The bill was drafted by Joseph Rothman, then Special Assistant Attorney
General in charge of Art Fraud for the State of New York. Mr. Rothman is also
credited with drafting all of the other New York art legislation discussed in this article.
60. In order to take advantage of this immunity, the expert would be required to
obtain certification from the New York State University Board of Regents. The Art
Dealers Association of America objected to the bill, possibly because of the limitation
which would have excluded them from this qualified privilege. See Shepard, Lefkowitz
Plans Art Fraud Bill, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1968, at 45, col. 4. See also Fake Art, supra
note 6.
61. The draftsman of the bill was apparently unaware of the grave potential for
fraud in this situation. By discrediting an authentic piece, an expert could acquire it at a
low price through a straw man. In addition, many valuable pieces which could add a
great deal to the body of knowledge being developed about an ancient civilization might
be carelessly discredited.
62. Cf. 90 CONG. R.e. 3396 (1968). Bernard Berenson, an art expert, received
10% of the sales price from Joseph Duveen for those forgeries Berenson certified as
genuine. Id.
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authenticity. The bill failed, 63 and it is submitted that the New York
legislature acted wisely, since it is likely that the statute, if enact-
ed, would have been declared unconstitutional. The state action of
depriving a citizen of the right to redress an alleged wrong would
probably be invalidated under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The licensing scheme, however, should be reconsidered since there
is presently no manner in which the public can be assured that the
expert is capable of making a valid evaluation; there are no standards or
63. Many alleged experts obtain a personal covenant against suit in the agreement
between themselves and a client. See FnrDImN & WEiL supra note 47, at 1011. This
type of provision is not favored by the law. In some jurisdictions, such covenants have
been declared void as against public policy. See Straight v. James Talcott, Inc., 329 F.2d
I (10th Cir. 1964); Dearborn Motors Credit Corp. v. Neel, 184 Kan. 437, 337 P.2d 992
(1959); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 342 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1959).
In others, they are strictly construed against the writer and given limited effect. See Boll
v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 281 App. Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1953), aff'd mem., 307
N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d 836 (1954); McCombs v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 178 S.W.2d 729,
(Tex. Civ. App.) aff'd, 143 Tex. 257, 183 S.W.2d 716 (1944). The Restatement of
Contracts provides:
"(1) A bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of willful breach
of duty is illegal, and a bargain for exemption from liability for the consequnces of
negligence is illegal if
"(b) one of the parties is charged with a duty of public service, and the bargain
relates to negligence in the performance of any part of its duty to the public, for which it
has received or been promised compensation." REsTATEMENT OF CoRrAcrs § 575
(1932).
Art authenticators are professionals and hold themselves out as having special
expertise in their field. They should be considered as performing a public service and
thus prohibited from extracting covenants against suit when performing their analyses.
While article two of the Uniform Commercial Code would not apply to a contract for
service (see Historic Shrines Foundations, Inc. v. Dali, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 71 (1967)), it
may nevertheless afford some guidance when a professional uses a form contract in his
dealing with a nonprofessional who relies on the former's good faith. The Uniform
Commercial Code provides: "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result." UNrFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-302.
Comment 1 to this section points out that it is designed to allow courts to rule on the
unconscionability question directly, rather than manipulate the rules of contract law to
reach a fair result. The basic test is whether, in light of all surrounding circumstances,
the contract is so one-sided as to make its enforcement unconscionable. See id., illus. 1.
When a court is faced with a situation in which a collector executes an art authentica-
tor's form contract containing exculpatory clauses and covenants against suit for the
expert's negligence, it should declare such provisions unenforceable. In addition, includ-
ing such provisions raises substantial ethical questions for an attorney. See ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSmtUTY EC 7-5, D.R. 7-102(A)(1)-(2) (1969).
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minimum qualifications for experts. Anyone can hold himself out as an
art authenticator. Indeed, it is commonly believed that all members of
a museum's professional staff are authorities in their fields; regretably,
this assumption is not always valid.64 Many of them do not possess
degrees in art history, museology, science, or related fields. 5 While
formal education is not conclusive proof of expertise, without some
other standard of measurement it is the best indicator available. Knowl-
edge gained by experience is often more valuable than that which is
obtained in the classroom. It should be a substitute for formal educa-
tion and is necessary as a supplement to a degree. Yet, without some
objective gauge by which to measure an individual's subjective knowl-
edge, it may not be safe to rely on it.66 In general, the expert is one with
special knowledge acquired by both study and experience. His area of
expertise will be quite small, and, even here, the expert will not claim
infallibility. One must realize that in obtaining an expert's evaluation,
the statement is still an opinion.6" The New York bill would have
required accreditation by the New York Board of Regents, and the body
charged with administration of the act was to have formulated minimum
standards for certification. 68  Such a procedure is essential, for without
64. John H. Merryman, Sweitzer Professor of Law at Stanford Law School,
recently pointed out some examples of unethical practices which have occurred in several
museums. Merryman, Are Museum Trustees and the Law Out of Step?, 74 ART NEws,
Nov. 1975, at 24. At least one of these situations, referred to as "The Trustees and the
Carpenter," involved individuals who lacked both moral integrity and technical expertise.
In this case, an inexperienced carpenter was allowed to act as museum director for some
time. When an inventory was taken several years ago in the museum in question and
given to the trustees, the problem became evident. The incompetent director was
replaced, and the museum is currently attempting to recover its lost articles. The
trustees have also sought advice from experts on their proper role. Id.
65. Id. See generally AMERICAN ASSOCIATIONS OF MUSEUMS, OFFICIAL MUSEUM
DIRECTORY (1975); WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN ART (Jacques Cattell Press ed. 1973).
66. Long years of experience may mean nothing if there is no increase in
meaningful knowledge. Similarly, the possession of a degree in a field without practice
and continued education is not an indication of current expertise. This point has been
recognized by several professions, which require either continued practice, periodic
courses, or both. See, e.g., CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5026 (West 1974) (account-
ing); ORE. REV. STAT. § 678.101 (1974) (nursing).
67. Easby & Colin, supra note 47, at 258.
68. The bill defined an accredited fine arts expert as "a natural person certified by
the board of regents of the university of the state of New York or by a corporation
formed or chartered by such board for such purpose, pursuant to the provisions of section
two hundred sixteen of the education law, as possessing the necessary training, skill and
qualifications to form a sound judgment as to the genuiness or authenticity of works of
fine art within the scope of his specialty or specialities as defined or limited and certified
by any of the aforesaid accrediting agencies, or a natural person certified by any other
accrediting agency of this or any other country which has been certified by the board of
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establishing criteria for evaluating experts, the public cannot be ade-
quately protected.
Yet the study bill went too far by immunizing the license holder
from suit in several instances. Experts are professionals and should be
held to the highest standard of performance. They should be required
to document the reasons for their conclusions. Even stylistic experts
can verbalize the facts upon which they base their findings. If they are
granted greater flexibility with their decisions and immunity from suit, it
is likely that their standards will decline."' As a result, even more
forgeries might flood the art market and valuable masterpieces be
discredited.
70
Methods of Authentication 71
As a practical matter, the cost of authenticating a work of art may
be prohibitive when the item in question is not worth a considerable
amount. Therefore, less expensive frauds may go undetected. Yet it
should be borne in mind that it takes a great deal of time and skill to
create a good forgery. The likelihood that a counterfeiter will devote
the necessary resources to minor pieces is small, since even he will
expect a fair return for his work. In the underdeveloped nations,
however, poor wages may provide the necessary incentive for inexpen-
sive forgeries. 2
regents or by a corporation formed or chartered by such board for such purpose as
aforementioned, as substantially meeting the standards established by the rules and
regulations promulgated by the board of regents for accrediting fine arts experts in this
state." Print 5734, Intro. 4818, introduced May 11, 1966.
69. A licensing scheme should not immunize a licensee from liability for his
negligent or intentional acts. Rather, the holder should remain vulnerable to suit.
Experts would be encouraged to exercise caution when making evaluations, since they
might ultimately be forced to justify their actions in court. Potential liability might have
the further advantage of improving the entire field of authentication, since experts who
fear large tort judgments might either leave the profession, if they are incompetent, or
devote more of their resources to education and research.
70. It is worth speculating on the possible fate of the Greek horse had it not
been owned by a museum willing to reexamine Dr. Noble's pronouncements. See note
27 supra. Not many individuals possess sufficient capital and stamina to employ a
panel of experts who will impartially examine a piece discredited by one of their number.
Indeed, not many experts would be willing to risk a colleague's scorn by correcting him.
71. I am indebted to Dr. Fred Stross of the Archaeological Research Facility,
University of California at Berkeley, for much of the scientific data which appears in
this portion of the article. His study on scientific authentication is perhaps one of the
best compilations of the scientific methods of authentication presently available; it will
appear in the author's forthcoming book, Deskbook of Art Law, to be published in
Spring, 1976, by Federal Publications, Inc.
72. See K. MEYER, THE MAYAN CRISIS (1972); cf. NEwswEEK, Apr. 23, 1973, at
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Fakers have access to the same information about authentication as
do the experts. If the rewards are sufficiently large, the forger can be
expected to perfect methods of avoiding detection. The newly created
antiquity, however, is not likely to withstand the test of time.73 A
counterfeit contemporary work does not have this inherent flaw. Its
detection is likely to come from stylists, although even they can be
misled. One of the greatest artistic geniuses of this century, Pablo
Picasso, frequently changed style to experiment with new media. Both
he and Braque, for instance, developed the collage which, for the first
time, incorporated papers, oilcloth and other materials into a single
work.
74
The problem faced by the stylist is not confined to contemporary
art. Enlightened artists were varying the styles of artistic representation
as early as 1350 B.C.75  Akhnaton was famous for the renaissance in
Egyptian art which occurred during his reign. His encouragement
caused artists to develop a realistic rather than stylized mode. As a
result, there are many Tel-El-Amarna pieces which are not in keeping
with other works of that period.76  The stylist must therefore be cau-
tious when declaring a work to be a forgery. His subjective evaluation
should be checked and reinforced by scientific tests when possible.
There is, however, no single scientific test that can be employed to
evaluate all works of art. Each has a narrow scope of applicability.
Radiocarbon Age Determination
One of the most well-known scientific methods used today is
radiocarbon dating.77  This technique is used to test materials de-
rived from once-living organisms; it provides estimates of the time
elapsed since termination of the metabolic processes. Such materials
73. Aging is a chemical process and the copy may not resemble the original after
time has passed. It is rumored that the forger de Hory would store his paintings for five
years to observe them undergo this change before placing them on the market. This
procedure could cause an expert to authenticate a piece and then later repudiate his
earlier pronouncement. See S. BURNHAM, THE ART CRowD 87 (1973). This phenome-
non is a possible explanation for the extensive reattributions at the Metropolitan Museum
in New York. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
74. G. HAMILTON, 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY ART 212 (1970).
75. FoGi, supra note 8, at 8.
76. C. DESROCHES-NOBLECOURT, TUTANKHAMEN 126 (1964).
77. See Broeckner & Kulp, The Radiocarbon Method of Age Determination, 22
AM. ANTIQUITY 1 (1956). It is interesting to note that the actual cost for having a sim-
ple radiocarbon test performed is between $100 and $200. Commercial laboratories may
charge more. Libby, Ruminations on Radiocarbon Dating, in RADIOCARBON VARIATIONS
AND ABSOLUTE CHRONOLOGY 639 (Olsson ed. 1970).
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include charcoal, wood, paper, leather, parchment, hair, textiles, seeds,
pollen, plants, flesh, dung, peat, organic muds and soils, bones (includ-
ing teeth and ivory), and shells. The technique is based on counting
residual radiocarbon activity and is absolute, which means that, in
principle at least, the result is given directly in years elapsed since death.
The scientist is not forced to judge the work in relation to other known
pieces.
The dating range covered by this technique lies between a
few hundred and 40,000 to 50,000 years. The upper limit can be
extended by employing special precautions and procedures which com-
plicate the method.
One of the earliest applications of the radiocarbon dating technique
also provides a curious example of authentication, albeit unintentional.
J.R. Arnold, who developed the test in close association with W.F.
Libby 78 collected ancient Egyptian wood samples of supposedly known
origin to test the method. Among the first three samples was a wood
fragment from a solar boat of Snefru, a fourth dynasty pharaoh. The
date determined was astonishingly close to that estimated by archaeolog-
ical evidence, approximately 2,600 B.C.. A fragment from the tomb of
third dynasty King Zoser, who had live approximately seventy-five
years earlier, also gave satisfactory results. The third sample, however,
gave a count that looked as if the wood had been cut quite recently. The
best technique had been employed in the experiment; consequently it
was feared that there was something drastically wrong with the princi-
ples underlying the method. When Libby communicated the bad news
to the museum authorities who had furnished the sample, they reexam-
ined its pedigree. They soon found that it had come from a dealer in
Cairo rather than from a well-controlled excavation, and further investi-
gation showed that the sample was a modem forgery. 79
To avoid detection, today's forger would manufacture purported
artifacts from ancient wood, which is easily acquired by members of the
trade. If cost is no object, there are probably few physical tests which
cannot be thwarted, once they are known to the forger. It is important
to note, however, that the methods will be effective as applied to objects
found and documented before a -test is published. This circumstance
must not be used as an argument against publication of technical
78. Libby, who developed the test, is an acknowledged expert in this area. See
Libby, Ruminations on Radiocarbon Dating, in RADIoCAIBON VARuiAToNs AND ABSOLUTE
CHRONOLOGY 429 (Olsson ed. 1970).
79. Letter from James R. Arnold to Dr. Fred Stross, Nov. 2, 1973, on file with
author.
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progress in authentication, for without publication, research would with-
er.
Thermoluminescent Analysis
Another scientific test which has been devised is called thermolu-
minescent analysis (TL).8 ° When certain materials are heated, they
emit a visible but faint light called thermoluminescence. This light
precedes and occurs in addition to the ordinary heat glow produced by a
sample. The material for which this technique is especially suited is
ceramic ware or fired clay."1 Clay contains small amounts of radioac-
tive impurities; therefore, when it is fired, it releases charge-carriers
such as electrons. As the piece is exposed to radiation from numerous
sources, including cosmic rays and the soil in which it may be buried,
the charge-carriers liberated from this external radiation become
trapped in the crystal lattices which form part of the mineral structure of
the clay. The concentration of these particles builds up over time;
therefore, when a sample is heated and the particles are freed, they emit
a TL which, when measured, can give the time elapsed since the last
firings2 of the clay. TL analysis is an absolute method, which can give
results directly from measurable parameters. If, however, the nature of
the sample is not favorable or the original context83 in which the piece
was found has been destroyed, some of these parameters may be diffi-
cult to measure. The accuracy of the results will be correspondingly
decreased.
TL analysis is applicable to age periods ranging from about three
hundred years to that of the oldest pottery known. The error to be
expected varies with the nature of the specimen. Recent test programs
indicate that the difference between the average TL age and the accept-
80. See Aitken, Zimmerman, Fleming & Huxtable, Thermolumninescent Dating of
Pottery, in RADIOCARBON VARIATIONS AND ABSOLUTE CHRONOLOGY, 129 (Olsson ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as Dating of Pottery]. See also ART LAW, supra note 45, at
511.
81. Dating of Pottery, supra note 80, at 129. Application to other materials of
a related nature is being studied but is beyond the scope of this discussion.
82. The time period given usually reveals when the piece was first fired; however,
if it was subsequently exposed to a temperature which exceeds 300* C., the time period
obtained will point to the later date, because the most recent heating will have dissipated
the charge carriers trapped prior to this firing. See ART LAW, supra note 45, at 503.
83. For example, the area where the piece was found might be so disturbed that it
is impossible to obtain useful samples for analysis. In addition, illicitly imported pieces
can rarely be traced to their exact points of origin. Perhaps this fact provides an
argument in favor of international regulation of art. See generally ART LAW, supra note
45.
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ed chronological age is no more than 10 percent. In the best cases, the
error may be even less, if the factors which contribute to the error are
sufficiently identifiable to be compensated for.8 4
Even though TL analysis has only recently been developed, and
modifications of the technique are still being worked out at a relatively
rapid rate, it has been applied to authentication problems in a number of
cases with spectacular results. Activity in the northeastern Mediterra-
nean region, from northern Greece to Mesopotamia, has played a signif-
icant part in revealing the remnants of what may be the most ancient
urban civilization on earth. In Anatolia, the evidence of such civiliza-
tion dating back to 7,000 B.C. has been particularly important.
Pottery begins to appear in strata corresponding to the middle of the
seventh millenium B.C. Toward the middle of the sixth millenium, the
art of pottery had become advanced, and the ceramic ware, vessels,
figurines and the like, had achieved a remarkable degree of sophistica-
tion and beauty. Professor J. Mellaart, discoverer of these Anatolian
sites, found evidence of clandestine digging when his attention was first
drawn to a site near Hacilar. 5 It soon proved to be abundant in
artifacts from the ancient cultures. It is not surprising that the price of
the Hacilar finds on the antiquities market began to soar; individual
pieces of Hacilar painted pottery have fetched as much as $75,000. With
this incentive, not only the looters, but also the forgers, became active.
By 1965 acquisitions by the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, and by
other public and private collections, came under scrutiny. In 1969, the
technique of TL analysis had been developed by the Research Laborato-
ry for Archaeology and the History of Art, Oxford University. In that
year, a group of nearly seventy pieces of Anatolian pottery, brought
together from museums, collections, and dealers, was submitted to the
Oxford laboratory for analysis. Of the objects studied, only eighteen
were found to be genuine. 6
At this time the TL test is probably one of the most difficult for a
forger to circumvent. 87  Leading experts suggest that even a skilled
84. Dating of Pottery, supra note 80, at 129.
85. For more details on this interesting incident, see Pearson & Connor, The
Strange Case of James Mellaart, 9 HoRMzON 12 (1967).
86. Aitken, Moorey & Ucko, The Authenticity of Vessels and Figurines in the
Hacilar Style, 13 ARCHABOMEMhY 89 (1971).
87. There are, however, some difficulties which have baffled the scientists. When
Mexican clay figures which some believe to be fakes made within the last 100 years were
subjected to TL analysis, they yielded dates of from 200 B.C. to 2,50W B.C. Since the
samples had been fired in the testing process, the TL emission on a second test should
have been zero. When retested sometime later, however, the samples had regained about
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physicist might not be able to reproduce a believable signal, let alone
one in accord with the time period he might be aiming at. If the reward
is high enough, however, a combination of great scientific and artistic
talent may, in time, develop a convincing forgery that might pass both
stylistic study and TL analysis.
Obsidian Hydration
When an antiquity is created from obsidian (volcanic crystal), it
can be subjected to the obsidian hydration test. 8 This technique is
valuable in estimating the period of time elapsed since the present
surface of an obsidian artifact was exposed or shaped. Such artifacts
include scrapers, knives, sickles, drills, fish hooks, ornamental carvings,
weapon points, and any other obsidian object which in its making was
worked so as to expose a fresh surface.
This method of dating is most valuable to the archaeologist, though
collectors may also exploit it. The test has been successfully used to
uncover numerous Mexican and Mayan forgeries.89
Fission Tracks
Another scientific test for authentication makes use of fission
tracks." This technique can be used on glassy or crystalline substances
containing uranium. The uranium causes radiation damage, and it is
this damage which, increasing with time, can be measured to provide
an estimate of the time passed since the material was created.
The fission track technique is of particular value in dating sub-
stances from seventy thousand to about a million years old. The
radiocarbon method does not work with pieces created during this
period. In addition, with suitable materials and uranium concentration,
the fission track method is capable of age-dating materials months to
millions of years old.
10% of their earlier age indication. This result would mean that after approximately 50
years the piece would give a TL reading of about 2,500 B.C. There is speculation that
this type of clay is particularly susceptible to ultraviolet rays and thus gives misleading
readings on TL analysis. See Honan, The Case of the Hot Pots, N.Y. Times, June 18,
1975, § 6 (Magazine) at 14.
88. See Friedman & Smith, A New Dating Method Using Obsidian: Part I. The
Development of the Method, 25 AM. ANTIQUITY 476 (1960). See also Friedman &
Evans, Obsidian Dating Revisited, 162 SCIENCE 813 (1968).
89. See Friedman & Smith, A New Dating Method Using Obsidian: Part I. The
Development of the Method, 25 AM. ANTIQUrTY 476 (1960). See also Friedman &
Evans, Obsidian Dating Revisited, 162 SCIENCE 813 (1968).
90. See Fleischer, Price & Walker, Quaternary Dating by the Fission Track
Technique, in SCIENCE AND ARCHAELOGOY (Brill ed. 1971).
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Substances which are susceptible to analysis by this method in-
clude, in decreasing order of uranium concentration, man-made glass,
zircon, apatite, natural glass (obsidian) and hornblende. 9' This tech-
nique determines the age of the formation or production of the material,
not the time elapsed since it was shaped into an artifact. The two may
coincide, as in the case of man-made glass. In the case of natural
substances, however, the age determined is that of the formation of the
rock, such as the time of the volcanic eruption that produced a given
flow of obsidian, not when it was shaped into an artifact.
Thus, the test has limited applicability to artifacts which have been
worked by man since it can only give the age of the material and not the
date of the carving. When, however, the fission track technique has
been applied to glass, glazes, minerals in pottery, and slags, the results
have been in accord with the archaeologically estimated ages of the
pieces. 2
Comparative Analysis
The principle of the comparative analysis technique9 3 of dating is
to develop, by determination of elements or functional groups, charac-
teristic composition patterns. These patterns can be compared with
those of a known sample, from which the information sought can be
deduced. This approach is very general.
Not infrequently, the composition of the paints, the ground, or
other constituents of paintings are known, for the periods or artists to
whom the paintings have been ascribed, either by prior analysis or from
contemporary records. Alternatively, it may be known that certain
components came into use at a certain time, and their presence in a
work of art supposedly created earlier than this date would label it a
forgery, or at least a restoration. Thus, the presence of a single element
or compound may constitute strong evidence against authenticity. This
approach may be referred to as a test by establishing anachronism.
This test is probably the most widely and successfully used. A
famous example is the study of the Etruscan Terracotta Warriors of the
Metropolitan Museum. The presence of significant amounts of man-
ganese in the black glaze was evidence used in establishing the spu-
rious nature of the objects. 4
91. Id.
92. Nishimura & Susumu, Fission Track Dating of Archaeological Materials from
Japan, 230 NATURE, 242-243 (1971).
93. See TREATISE ON ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY (Kolthoff & P. Elving eds. 1961).
94. Von Bothmer & Noble, Etruscan Terracotta Warriors, 11 METROPOLITAN
MUSEUM PAPERS 1 (1961).
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The test determining provenance is most useful for the archaeolo-
gist. The best-known applications have occurred in the determination
of the trace and minor components of obsidian, pottery, and quartzite
artifacts, and the comparison of the composition patterns with the
corresponding patterns of the sources from which the raw materials
might have come.9 5 Trade routes and patterns of cultural interchange
can be critically studied by using this technique.
This principle can also be used in the identification and authentica-
tion of works of art. It is known that the ratios of stable isotopes of
some elements in certain materials vary, depending on their geological
source. It has been shown that the lead in paintings produced prior to
1820 exhibits isotope ratios in a range typical of European ores, while
more modern samples show a greater range of isotopes, typical of more
modem sources of lead, which include deposits from the United States,
Canada, and Australia.96 Thus, while much background work still
remains to be done, one may expect to be able to distinguish paintings
and other lead-containing artifacts of different cultural periods on the
basis of their lead isotope ratios. In 1968, the Mellon Foundation
announced that it was sponsoring a study to perfect a method of atomic
pigment analysis for the works of old masters. 97
The test by comparative characterization, while general in nature,
may nevertheless provide valuable information when other methods are
not decisive. It may be used when more or less subtle changes take
place on the surfaces of intrinsically homogeneous materials. These
changes can be detected by comparison of the surface composition with
that of the bulk substance.
An interesting use of this method was made in the authentication
of some Egyptian limestone sculptures that had been buried in a sandy
locale in Upper Egypt. 98  It was found that several of the elements
studied, particularly barium, copper, and manganese, showed significant
enrichment on the surface. The process and chemistry of desert varnish
formation were described some thirty-five years after the objects had
been acquired by the collector and thus could not have been anticipated
95. See Stevenson, Stross & Heizer, An Evaluation of X-Ray Fluorescence Analy-
sis as a Method for Correlating Obsidian Artifacts with Source Locations, 13 ARcHAEOM-
ETRY 17 (1971). See also Heizer, Stross, Hester, Albee, Perlman, Asaro & Bowman,
The Colossi of Memnon Revisited, 182 SCIENCE 1219 (1973).
96. Cf. Brill & Wampler, Isotope Studies of Ancient Lead, 71 AM. J. ARCHAEOL-
ooY 63 (1967).
97. See TIME, Apr. 5, 1968, at 87.
98. ANAL. CHEM., Mar. 1960, at 17.
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by a putative forger, even if it were possible to simulate the characteris-
tic patina at the same time as the erosion evident on the surface.
Analytical Reconstruction of Manufacturing Techniques
The problem of recreating ancient, forgotten techniques has been
handled in a variety of ways, generally involving analysis, deductions,
and trial and error. Obviously, no general method can be provided, but
examples do indicate what has been accomplished along these lines. An
exemplary study by Schumann on the rediscovery of the technique of
"terra sigillata and Greek red-black painting," later elaborated by oth-
ers, shed light on other ceramic techniques as well.9 Reports have
been prepared describing illuminating studies of ancient glassmaking
techniques as well as of metallurgical procedures in antiquity. 100
Schumann's painstaking reconstruction of an ancient process was
to provide the most telling evidence for the exposure of the Etruscan
Warriors as forgeries.'' During World War I, the Metropolitan Mu-
seum acquired several alleged Etruscan terracotta statues, which were
exhibited in a dramatic setting for nearly three decades. Doubts regard-
ing their authenticity were expressed by Professor Pallottino of Rome as
early as 1937.102 Finally, Schumann's research made it possible to
make a factual study of the situation. The terracottas, and especially
the glazes, were found to contain much higher amounts of manganese
than would be consistent with ancient manufacture. A series of test
firings, and comparison with authentic red-and-black ware, confirmed
the conclusion that the terracottas were recent forgeries. The case was
closed when representatives of the Metropolitan succeeded in reaching a
survivor of the team that had actually made the statues. He managed to
supply the missing thumb of one of the warriors. 10 3
Microscopic Techniques
The optical microscope is such a generally useful device that one
may begin the study of almost any object by looking at it through a low-
power binocular microscope. 04 Further examination at higher power
99. Schumann, Oberflichenverzierung in der Antken Todpserkunst, Terra Sigillata
und griechische Schwarzrotmalerei, 23 BER. DErSCH. KERAM. Gas. 408 (1942).
100. Brill, Ancient Glass, 209 Sci. AM., Nov. 1963, at 120.
101. See note 94 & accompanying text supra.
102. M. PALLOTriNo, ROMA 473 (1973).
103. Von Bothmer & Noble, Etruscan Terracotta Warriors, 11 METROPOLITAN
MUSEUM PAPERS 1 (1961).
104. See E. CHAmoT & C. MASON, HANDBOOK OF CHEMICAL MICROSCOPY (3rd ed.
1958). See also L. BiER, ARcHAEOLOGY AND THE MICROSCOPE (1963).
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and under special conditions may follow. A competent microscopist
develops an empirical background of images of the structures in which
he has specialized. This knowledge often enables him to recognize
similarities and differences in the pertinent structures of the respective
materials.
X-Ray and Related Methods
X-radiographs provide remarkable insights into the structure of
paintings in general.10 5 They often reveal underlying brush strokes,
and in some cases, even the fingerprints of the artist. Underlying
painting, which sometimes is brought out quite clearly by radiographs,
may provide evidence of forgery, of extensive restoration, of an artist's
displeasure with his own work or a reluctance to waste a spoiled canvas
that could still be used.
There are many examples of the use of X-radiography in the study
of alterations of paintings. An instructive case is the overpainting by
Titian of Bellini's Feast of the Gods.
10 6
The case of the Metropolitan Greek Horse' 0 7 is of particular inter-
best because the result of the X-radiography examination was misinter-
preted, and as a consequence, an incorrect conclusion was reached
initially. This error occurred because the person in charge of the study
was inadequately informed, not because of a failure of the test itself. He
believed that the presence of a terracotta core held in place by iron
bands, as shown on shadowgraph, conclusively established the piece to
be of recent origin. After further investigation, however, he learned
that craftsmen in ancient Greece used this technique for creating bronz-
es.' 08
X-Ray Diffraction
X-ray diffraction determines the degree and the character of inter-
nal structure of materials that are not amorphous or colloidal. 109 Thus,
this method is applicable to a great variety of substances. It has been
used on jewelry of all kinds, medieval niellos, devitrification products of
glass, pottery and glazes, pigments and jades. The sample must be in
105. See Moss, The Application of X-rays, Gamma Rays, Ultra-violet and Infra-red
Rays to the Study of Antiquities, HANDBOOK FOR MUSEUM CURATORS (1954).
106. See J. WALKER, BELLINI AND TITIAN AT FERRARA (1957). It is interesting to
speculate concerning the reaction of art historians had the overpainter been an artist less
established than Titian.
107. See note 27 supra.
108. Id.
109. See E. NUFFIELD, X-RAY DIFFRACTION METHODS (1966).
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powdered form, but the amount needed is small, and the method is not
destructive in itself; therefore it can be used for subsequent analysis.
Diffraction analysis has also been used in the detection of faked patina
on bronzes.110
Auto-radiography
Auto-radiography reveals structural details of paintings and their
supports."' Use of this technique is being developed in the study and
conservation of other art objects-photographs, drawings, and old man-
uscripts. The technique differs from conventional X-radiography in that
it produces a series of radiographs of a painting, each of which is quite
different from the others, and all of which are different from X-radi-
ographs. Analysis of such a series of auto-radiographs permits the
identification of a number of the pigments used in a painting; it gives
information on the manner in which they were originally put down by
the artist, as well as their distribution throughout the body of the
painting. In the words of the originators of the technique, "it is
essentially a laboratory tool for the investigation of the architecture of
paintings."" 2
While these tests are feasible when a major work is involved, their
effectiveness must be balanced against the costs involved in the utiliza-
tion of experts and laboratories. An individual will rarely, as a practical
matter, resort to them to analyze minor acquisitions. One may, how-
ever, perform a simple chemical test. Kits for novices have been
prepared and should be used whenever the item in question is suscepti-
ble to such analysis." 3
Some forgeries are practically undetectable. For example, it was
discovered that six sculptures of bronze nudes allegedly created by
Giacometti were actually unauthorized copies cast from an original
bronze rather than from the artist's mold. This method of forgery is
one of the most difficult to detect."
4
Existing Legislation
The discussion thus far has focused on the categories into which art
forgeries fall and the means currently available for identifying them.
110. See, e.g., Aitken, Physics and Archaeology, 1961 INTERSCIENCE 165.
111. See E. SAYRE & H. LICETMAN, 13 STUDIES IN CONSERVATION 161 (1968).
112. Id.
113. See 88 SCIENCE NEws LETTER 296 (1965). The instructions in these kits must
be followed precisely, since carelessness can result in injury to the work and inaccurate
results.
114. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1967, at 28, col. 2.
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This section will be devoted to an analysis of existing legislation which is
designed to inhibit forgers or to provide the defrauded purchaser with
some relief. While some of this legislation is broad in scope, covering
the entire spectrum of art, other statutes are limited to a specific cate-
gory, such as fine prints, or to a class of craftsmen, such as Indians.
Penal Law
The federal", 5 and state" 6 general antifraud statutes may deter the
forger. Yet the penalties for violating them are slight when compared
to the potential profit which may be gained by creating and successfully
disseminating fakes."' In addition, they all require proof of a fraudu-
lent or criminal intent."" This element is easily established in the case
of the forger but becomes less satisfactory when applied to an intermedi-
ate seller, who may merely suspect the spurious origin of the object.
These statutes are totally worthless when the transferor is unaware of the
deception and fails to have the piece authenticated.' 19 In fact, the
provisions may encourage sellers to remain ignorant about the authentic-
ity of the pieces they sell.
Even the federal statute'20 designed to protect Indian artisans by
imposing penalties on one who sells Indian crafts which are not accur-
ately described requires the seller to have knowledge of the misattribu-
tion. While the Federal Trade Commission announced' 2' that it would
strictly enforce the law, the market in counterfeit Indian jewelry and
wares remains active. The situation has become so devastating' 22 that
several states have enacted their own laws.
115. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1970).
116. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 267, § I (Supp. 1975); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 470 (West 1972).
117. The federal law provides penalties of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment
for not more than five years or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970); cf. id. § 496 (customs
documents) (fine up to $10,000).
118. See, e.g, CAL. PEN. CODE § 470 (West 1972).
119. See generally Wiirtenberger, Criminological and Criminal-law Problems of the
Forging of Paintings, in ASPECTS OF ART FORGERY 15 (1962). Thus, many of the
individuals in categories two and three discussed in the text accompanying note 11 would
escape prosecution.
120. Indian Arts & Crafts Board Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (1970).
121. Federal Trade Commission Announced Enforcement Policy With Respect to
Misrepresentation of Certain Articles As Genuine and Authentic Products of American
Indian Craftsmanship, FTC New Release (Apr. 18, 1968).
122. See Lichtenstein, Fad for Indian Jewelry: Unethical Are Moving In On a
Lucrative Market. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1975, at 9, col. 1. High prices have also resulted
in an increase in theft. See United States v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1975)
(defendant convicted of interstate transportation of stolen Indian jewelry believed to be
worth $40,000 to $50,000).
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Alaska appears to have been the first to confront this dilemma. By
the early 1960's the quantity of counterfeit native'23 handicrafts had
become staggering. In an apparent attempt to eliminate this problem,
the legislature enacted statutes 24 which allow for a seal to be placed on
authentic items. The legislation defines native handicrafts as those
pieces which are created by a resident having not less than one-quarter
Eskimo, Aleut or Indian blood. 12 5 Criminal penalties are imposed on
any person who is guilty of intentionally misusing the seal or selling an
object which falsely bears it.' 28  It was anticipated that this labeling
would increase sales since consumers would be less wary of the objects
they were purchasing.
1 27
In 1975, the Alaska legislature enacted a second series of statutes,
which are similar in most respects to the laws protecting native handi-
crafts. 28 The new laws are designed to protect items made in the state
by resident Alaskans.129  It further provides the seal used shall have a
"distinctive design that is entirely different from the native handicraft
seal . . ."30 There had been some opposition to this legislation, since
it was felt that consumers would fail to understand the distinction
between the two seals.' 3'
Both sets of Alaska statutes impose penal sanctions on persons who
knowingly and willfully violate them.132  Arizona's law 33 goes further
than these statutes by omitting any requirement of knowledge on the
part of the seller or trader when disseminating counterfeit Indian crafts.
This omission may be interpreted as imposing a duty of inquiry on the
dealer. It would have been more desirable, however, to include this
duty in the legislation itself.
123. Included as counterfeits are items made outside of the state and those manu-
factured out of simulated material, as well as pieces created by individuals other than
natives. For several vivid examples of the problem see Consumer Protection Section,
Office of the Attorney General, State of Alaska, Suggestions and Guidelines, Aug. 28,
1974.
124. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.65.010-.070 (1962).
125. Id. § 45.65.070.
126. Id .§ 45.65.060.
127. See note 123 supra.
128. ALASKA STAT. § 45.66.010-.080 (1975).
129. "[R]esident means a person whose domicile is the State of Alaska." Id. §
45.66.080(3).
130. Id. § 45.66.030.
131. Letter from Richard Svobodny, Attorney, Alaska Legal Services Corporation,
to Leonard Du Boff, February 21, 1975.
132. ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.060, 45.66.060 (1975).
133. ARrz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1231 to 1233 (Supp. 1975).
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New Mexico has actually gone this far by providing that
[i]t is hereby made the duty of every person selling or offering
for sale authentic or imitation Indian arts and crafts, or both, to
make due inquiry of their suppliers of such arts and crafts concern-
ing the methods used in producing such arts and crafts and to deter-
mine whether such arts and crafts are in fact authentic Indian arts
and crafts or imitation -Indian arts and crafts. .... 1. 4
The statute also provides that it is unlawful for any person to sell or
offer for sale any Indian arts and crafts as authentic unless they are in
fact authentic. 135  While this innovative law should make prosecution
of forgers and dealers less difficult, it still may not entirely eliminate the
problem. The penalty imposed for its violation is slight136 when com-
pared to the prices charged for authentic Indian crafts.'37 This consid-
eration appears to have influenced the draftsmen of the Colorado stat-
ute.'38 That law not only imposes a duty of inquiry on sellers but
provides realistic penalties for its violation.
39
The Colorado law is the most comprehensive and precise piece of
legislation thus far enacted to police the Indian art market. 4 ° Unfortu-
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-21-25.4 (Supp. 1975).
135. Id. § 40-21-25.5(A).
136. A fine of between $100 and $500, or imprisonment for from thirty to ninety
days, or both. Id. § 40-21-25.6.
137. One article estimated that "[The total haul by con artists peddling fake
Indian jewelry now runs to $40,000,000 a year." CHANGING TIMES, Sept. 1975, at 4. The
New York Times stated an estimate "that the market in Indian jewelry is now well over
a billion dollars a year. Of that, 40-million is phony one way or another .... "
Lichtenstein, Fad for Indian Jewelry: Unethical Are Moving in on a Lucrative Market,
N.Y. Times, July 11, 1975, at 9, col. 1. The article points out that an authentic hand-
worked Navajo squashblossom necklace might retail for $1,200, while a machine-stamped
squashblossom necklace with a lower grade of turquoise should sell for $450. A hand-
worked silver bracelet with high grade turquoise retails for $350, while "a cheap bracelet
of chunky blue stones that were mostly plastic in a nickle setting" should sell for only
$20. The article further states "[o]nly a well-schooled buyer . . . could spot the
variations" and "unethical dealers can .. . sell them [the fakes] for the same price they
would get for handmade items." Id.
138. COL. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 12-44.5 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
139. Violations of this statute are punishable by fines of up to $5,000 or imprison-
ment for twenty-four months or both. Id. §§ 12-44.5-107, 18-1-106 (1973 & Cum. Supp.
1975). In addition, the Colorado statute provides that an aggrieved purchaser may
commence an action in the Colorado district court to recover any actual damages
sustained as a result of a violation of the act. A judgment may also include litigation
costs and attorneys' fees. Id. § 12-44.5-108 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
140. The statute contains a comprehensive definitional section, including criteria for
gem quality, silver content, and methods of workmanship. It also requires sellers to
label authentic pieces clearly and segregate them from imitations. Moreover, it covers
trades as well as traditional sales. See id. §§ 12-44.5-103, 12-44.5-105(b)-(c), 12-44.5-
106 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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nately, it is limited in territorial application and the market for Indian
wares is nationwide. 141  The only way to decrease substantially the
quantity of fake Indian crafts is to pass a federal law which imposes on
sellers a duty to inquire about the authenticity of objects they sell and
which provides penalties for its violation concomitant with the potential
economic gain. Even if such a statute were enacted, it would merely
affect a small portion of the market; other forms of art forgery would
continue to plague purchasers.
New York appears to be one of the few states that actually recog-
nizes the breadth of the art market. Its law142 describes as a class A
misdeameanant a person who, with the intent to defraud, "makes or
alters any object in such manner that it appears to have an antiquity,
rarity, source or authorship which it does not in fact possess" or a person
who, with knowledge of the object's true character and with the intent to
defraud, "utters or possesses an object so simulated." 143  In 1969, the
New York legislature also enacted a bill which imposes criminal penal-
ties on "[a] person who, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, makes, utters or issues a false certificate of authenticity of a
work of fine art.' 44  Unfortunately, these statutes suffer from some of
the same infirmities as the federal and Alaskan laws protecting Indian
crafts, as they require fraudulent intent and impose insignificant penal-
ties for their violation. 45 Moreover, as with all state laws, their applica-
tion is territorially limited.' 46
These statutes attack the problem by penalizing the forger or
fraudulent seller. They are designed to decrease the number of counter-
feit works of art being sold by inhibiting the perpetrators of the fraud.
Aside from the Colorado statute, 147 they do not provide any relief for
141. The Colorado legislature should nevertheless be commended for its valiant
effort. At least in that state, purchasers of Indian crafts can feel relatively safe when
acquiring these objects. The territorial limitation is, of course, a product of our
political structure, and state legislatures are limited in the effect they can have on a
nationwide market. Colorado's law may make it the leading center for Indian crafts.
Perhaps the other states which have a large Indian craft industry will follow Colorado's
lead if their sales dwindle and Colorado's increase.
142. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 170.45 (McKinney 1975).
143. Id.
144. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 226 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
145. A class A misdemeanor carries a penalty of imprisonment for up to one year
and/or a fine of up to $1,000. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 70.15, 80.05 (McKinney 1967).
146. See note 141 supra. While this legislation is not ideal, it places New York in
the forefront regarding art protective legislation and may mark that state as the safest
within which to purchase a work of art.
147. See note 139 supra.
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the deceived buyer. 4 '
Buyer's Remedies
As previously indicated, many purchasers do not take advantage of
the increasing body of knowledge concerning authentication of art
works. 149  As a result, vast quantities of forgeries flood the art market
each year. Furthermore, neither scientific tests nor stylistic analysis
can eliminate all forgeries; some fakes may go undetected until a new
method for uncovering them has been devised. The defrauded purchas-
er in this situation will not find solace in the fact that he has acquired a
well-executed counterfeit; rather, he will want to recover for his loss.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is thought by some
to afford a measure of relief. 150 Section 2-313'1' governs express
warranties in the sale of goods. In applying this section, the courts have
148. This impediment is common to all penal laws; in most instances, the enforce-
ment of laws such as the ones described is designed not to reimburse the defrauded
purchaser, but rather to inhibit the forger's future attempts at promoting fraudulent sales.
This rationale raises questions about the entire penal system and whether the existence of
a penalty really acts as a deterrent.
149. For an interesting commentary on this situation, see Lane, The Case of the
Careless Collector, ART IN AMERICA, vol. 53, Oct. 1965, at 90.
150. See Note, Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Solutions to Art Fraud and
Forgery, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 409 (1972). Contra, Art Legislation, supra note 9.
See also Note, Legal Control of the Fabrication and Marketing of Fake Paintings, 24
STAN. L. REv. 930 (1972). Whether the new Consumer Product Warranties Act will
apply to art warranties is an open question. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-2312 (Pamphlet
No. 1, Feb. 1975). It is believed, however, that this statute will suffer from the same
difficulties as the Uniform Commercial Code since the law requires the warranty to
become part of the basis of the bargain. Important aspects of the new act extend the
Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction, give it new rule making authority, and expand
its powers to proceed against violators. Id. §§ 2309(b), 2310(c)(i). Perhaps the
Federal Trade Commission will recognize the need for regulations and policing the art
market and exercise its new power in this theater.
151. Section 2-313 states:
"(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
"(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
"(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
"(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
"(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he have a specific intention to make
a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313.
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tended to focus on three problems: first, whether a description of the
item in question (core description) is a warranty; second, whether a
declaration is merely an opinion or instead an express warranty; and
third, whether a statement is part of the basis of the bargain.
Basic to section 2-313 of the code is the core description. In Hill
Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Simon,152 the plaintiff purchased an aircraft
which was paid for in part by a check bearing -the notation "Aero
Commander, N-2677B, Number 135, FAA, Flyable." Later, when the
plane was test flown, the plaintiff was informed that numerous repairs
would be necessary for it to be certified under Federal Aviation Regula-
tion Part 135 for both visual and instrumental flight. The court found
that the description "Number 135, FAA, Flyable" was an express
warranty that the craft would qualify for full certification under the
stated regulation.
The court in the Hill case dealt with terms having precise mean-
ings. Thus, if the plane were unable to leave the ground, it would not
be flyable. Similarly, by requiring repairs, it did not comply with the
FAA regulation.
One must consider, then, whether the statement that an item is, for
example, a "Rembrandt painting" constitutes a warranty that the picture
in question was painted by Rembrandt. This phrase is subject to
several interpretations; hence, its use may not necessarily serve as an
express warranty that Rembrandt executed the work. A court will have
to decide whether the term "Rembrandt painting" means that the pic-
ture in question was painted by that artist or merely that it is "in the
manner of" or "from the school of' the great master.153 Thus, the
designation "Rembrandt painting" may be a core description of the item
in question, yet the words are sufficiently ambiguous that they may be
deemed insufficient to create a warranty upon which a purchaser may
rely. 5
4
152. 122 Ga. App. 524, 177 S.E.2d 803 (1970). See also Rogers v. Crest Motors,
Inc., 516 P.2d 445 (Colo. 1973) (description "new automobile" created express warranty
which was breached when car in question was demonstrator); Crane v. Wood Motors,
Inc., 53 Mich. App. 17, 218 N.W.2d 420 (1974) (description of airplane as 1969 model
created express warranty); Farmer's Union Cooperative Gin v. Smith, 42 OKLA. ST. B.J.
2194, 9 UCC REP. SERv. 823 (1971) (description on label held to be express warranty).
153. For a definition of these terms see Art Legislation, supra note 9.
154. In one case the plaintiff purchased a machine described as a "hay baler."
When the machine was unable to fulfill its named function, the plaintiff sued for breach
of warranty. The case was tried under the Uniform Sales Act, and the majority of the-
appellate court concluded that no warranty had been breached. The dissent announced
that a description of a machine as a "hay baler" should be recognized as an express
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The second problem under section 2-313 is the necessity of distin-
guishing between an affirmation of fact or promise, which creates a
warranty, and a mere opinion, which does not. 15 5 The dividing line
between these two forms of statements is difficult, if not impossible, to
find.
In General Supply & Equipt. Co., Inc. v. Phillips,56 the defendant,
a seller of plastic greenhouse panels, distributed advertising materials
which stated: (1) "[Tjests show no deterioration in 5 years of normal
use"; (2) "It won't turn black or discolor .. .even after years of
exposure"; and (3) "[It] will not burn, rot, rust or mildew."'157 Ap-
proximately two years after the plaintiff installed these panels in his
greenhouse, they turned black, and he commenced an action for breach
of warranty. The court found that the statements in the advertisements
were express warranties, noting that
[t]he test for whether a given representation is a "warranty" or
a mere expression of opinion is: did the seller assume to assert
a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or did he merely express
a judgment about a thing as to which they may each be expected
to have an opinion. 5 8
This test might appear to resolve the difficulty of distinguishing between
representations which create warranties and mere puffing, which does
not. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to decide whether a statement is a
fact or a mere opinion. When the federal court sitting in Kentucky15
was presented with facts similar to those in Phillips, it reached the
opposite result. 16  The court found that a dealers' product manual
merely stated an opinion when it described the "General Characteris-
tics" of a type of seed in the following manner:
a pure single cross, excellent yield in area of adaptation, ability
to use high levels of fertility and available moisture, superior stand-
ability .. . . [v]ery good standability, can stand high population
under adequate fertility program, good blight tolerance, high test
weight .... 161
warranty that the item in question will bale hay. Moss v. Gardner, 228 Ark. 828, 210
S.W. 491 (1958). If the case had arisen under section 2-313 of the UCC, it is likely that
the court would have reached the opposite conclusion, since the language is not sus-
ceptible to any other interpretation.
155. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(2).
156. 12 UCC REP. SERV. 35 (1972).
157. Id. at 41.
158. Id. at 40.
159. Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 UC REP. SERV. 629 (1972).
160. The test used by the Texas court in Phillips was originally announced by the
Kentucky state court in Wedding v. Duncan, 310 Ky. 374, 220 S.W.2d 564 (1949). It is
interesting to note that the Bickett court did not even cite the test. See note 161 infra.
161. 12 UCC REP. Sanv. at 633.
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Applying the Phillips test to a statement about a work of art, it
might be argued that both buyer and seller can be expected to have an
opinion about the genuineness of the object and that therefore no
warranty is created. 16 2  On the other hand, the dealer has made a
statement about the authenticity of the item. If the buyer is otherwise
uninformed about the piece's origin, the test for finding a warranty may
be satisfied. Yet only the true artist or eyewitness' 63 can make a factual
statement about an art object's pedigree. It could therefore be argued
that a dealer's statement of authenticity is always his opinion and that no
warranty is created. The decision whether a seller's statement of attri-
bution is an express warranty of authenticity or mere sales talk must be
made on a case-by-case basis. Section 2-313 may prove to be an
illusive remedy for a purchaser of a counterfeit work of art when the
seller's statements are ambiguous.
Section 2-313 also provides that any statement or promise which
becomes part of the basis of the bargain is an express warranty.164 The
162. In an English case, the plaintiff purchased paintings described in the bill of
sale as "Four pictures, Views in Venice, Canaletto, 1601." Later, when the plaintiff
learned that the pictures were forgeries, he commenced an action for breach of warranty.
The trial judge let the jury decide whether the seller's use of the name Canaletto was a
warranty or merely his opinion. The jury found for the plaintiff and on appeal the
judgment was affirmed. Lord Denman stated, "It was therefore, for the jury to say,
under all circumstances, what was the effect of the words, and whether they implied a
warranty of genuineness, or conveyed only a description, or an expression of opinion."
The judge suggested that there is a distinction between very old works, on which sellers
can only express opinions, and more recent creations, which may be warranted as
authentic by individuals having knowledge of this fact. Power v. Barham, 111 Eng. Rep.
865, 866 (1836), citing Jediwine v. Slade, 170 Eng. Rep. 459 (1797). Thus, it might be
said that in the case of very old pieces, caveat emptor should apply unless the seller
purports to warrant the authenticity of the object in question. A different rule should
apply when both parties possess some expertise with respect to the goods to be sold and
assume the item to have certain attributes. If it appears that they are both honestly
mistaken about this fact and that it was difficult to ascertain its truth when the contract
was made, the buyer should be entitled to rescission based upon a mutual mistake of fact.
See Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887); cf. Smith v. Zimbalist, 2
Cal. App. 2d 324, 28 P.2d 70 (1935). The distinction between the test cited in Phillips
and a rule which permits rescission based on mutual mistake of fact is subtle but
important. If the buyer and seller have independent opinions on the authenticity of a
work, no warranty is created, and the buyer must rely on the validity of his own opinion.
In this situation, authenticity would not be part of the basis of the bargain. On the other
hand, if both parties honestly assume the fact of authenticity and this fact is part of the
basis of the bargain, the contract should be voidable at the buyer's option. This doctrine
predates the UCC; nevertheless, it should still have vitality under section 1-103.
163. This very fact has worked against a forger who was apprehended in the act of
creating a "masterpiece." See D. GOODRICH, ART FAKES IN AMmcA 49 (1973).
164. UNIFORM COMMMECIAL CODE § 2-313(1)(a). For a similar requirement
imposed by the Consumer Product Warranties Act see note 150 supra.
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difficulties generated by the application of the basis of the bargain test
were stated by Professor Honnold in his analysis of this section for the
New York Law Revision Commission.' 65 He pointed out that the test
was not precisely defined and was apparently designed to change the
Uniform Sales Act's requirement of buyer reliance.' 66 It is not clear
what will be required under the code's standard.
Comment 3 to section 2-313 states that affirmations of fact relating
to the goods, made by the seller to the buyer during the course of
negotiations, become part of the sales contract unless there is clear
affirmative proof to the contrary. No particular words are necessary to
create a warranty, and the seller's intent when making the representation
is immaterial. The pre-code requirement that a buyer must establish
that he relied 117 on the seller's statements when purchasing the item is
abolished in face-to-face negotiations. Nonetheless, some problems
remain unresolved. A buyer must establish that the seller's statements
were facts rather than opinions. 6 s In addition, the comment appears to
be confined to face-to-face transactions. While advertisements become
part of the basis of the bargain, the buyer must demonstrate that he was
aware of them in order to weave them into the contract.
169
The extent of buyer awareness necessary is unclear. In Putensen
v. Clay Adams, Inc.,1 0 a patient was allowed to recover for breach of a
warranty contained in sales literature read by her physician. The court
found that the physician was the plaintiffs agent and that the agent's
knowledge of the representations was sufficient to allow them to become
part of the basis of the bargain, notwithstanding that the plaintiff was
unaware of the statements. This result is sound, since the doctor
performed the medical procedure, and it was his knowledge that was
important in the transaction. Whether this reasoning can be extended
to a case in which the agent plays a more passive role is unclear.
Comment 3 points out that the issue is one of fact and will have to be
decided on a case-by-case basis. The art purchaser who negotiates
165. 1 N.Y. STATE LAW REV. COMM'N 392-93 (1955).
166. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 3. ("no particular
reliance. . . need be shown"). Yet some courts appear still to require that the buyer
rely on the representations before they become part of the basis of the bargain. See
Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 217, 490 P.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1971), aff'd in part 83 N.M.
730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
167. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 12 (1950) (requiring buyer reliance). See also
Pedroli v. Russell, 157 Cal. App. 2d 281, 320 P.2d 873 (1958).
168. See text accompanying notes 188-89 infra.
169. 12 UCC REP. SERv. 35 (1972).
170. 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970).
1006 [Vol. 27
CONTROLLING THE ARTFUL CON
through an agent but executes the contract himself may find that his
representative's knowledge of a false advertisement is not part of the
basis of his bargain.
Another unresolved issue is the point at which the representations
must be made in order to become part of the basis of the bargain.
Comment 1 to section 2-313 suggests that the representations are part
of the contract negotiations. Thus, it would seem that all pre-contract
statements communicated to the buyer or his active agent should be
considered part of the basis of the bargain. Comment 7 expands this
notion by pointing out that the precise time the statements are made
is immaterial and that the sole question is whether they can fairly be
regarded as part of the contract. It states further that if the statements
are made after the closing -they may be deemed modifications'7 1 and
thus part of the basis of the bargain. There seems to be an inconsistency
between the notion in comment 1 of contract negotiations -to induce the
bargain, and the allowance in comment 7 of post-closing statements;
however, this apparent conflict may be resolved by referring to the lan-
guage of the code, which defines a contract as "[t]he total legal obliga-
tion which results from the parties' argreement .. ".. ,12 Agreement
is in turn defined as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance . . . ,,"17 Ap-
parently, a statement may become part of the basis of the bargain wheth-
er it is made before or after the contract is executed so long as it is part
of the total bargain. Perhaps the allowance of post-closing statements
is the draftsmen's recognition that as a practical matter, a buyer may
be able to force a seller to rescind an otherwise valid contract after pay-
ment has been made but before the goods are actually received.' 7 4 This
interpretation suggests that the post-closing representation must be made
within a reasonable time. Comment 7 reinforces this point by provid-
ing an illustration of a post-closing warranty given while the goods are
being delivered.
The statement must also relate to the goods included in the con-
171. In this situation, the code does not require additional consideration. UNFoM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 7.
172. Id. § 1-201(11).
173. Id. § 1-201(3).
174. Indeed, many states allow consumers a period of time during which certain
contracts may be rescinded. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 83.720 (1971). In addition,
many sellers may, as a practical matter, be willing to rescind a contract with a regular
customer in order to preserve buyer good will for future sales.
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tract in order to become part of the basis of the bargain.' 75 When the
New Mexico Court of Appeals'" was presented with a case in which the
defendant's agent stated "you have got good tires" 77 immediately after
a car had been rented, 178 it found the representation was not part of the
basis of the bargain. The court also found that the rental agreement
had not been relied on by the plaintiffs before they leased the vehicle.
79
The court apparently felt that the contract between these parties extend-
ed only to the car rental and did not include an express warranty
regarding the tires. Rather than viewing the representation as part of
the basis of this bargain, the court probably considered it a separate
contract which, since it was not supported by consideration, was unen-
forceable.' 80
The art purchaser will have to demonstrate that he or his active
agent was aware of the seller's representation, that it was a statement of
175. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 (1)(a).
176. Stang v. Hertz Corp. 83 N.M. 217, 490 P.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1971), af'd in
part, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
177. Id. at 218, 490 P.2d at 476.
178. Id. at 219, 490 P.2d at 477. The court assumed that a lessor was equivalent to
a seller and that therefore the transaction was within the scope of article two of the
UCC. Id. at 218, 490 P.2d at 476.
179. Id. at 219, 490 P.2d at 477. This conclusion appears to fly in the face of
section 2-313, Comment 3. See note 166 supra. If the contract was embodied in the
lease agreement and it contained an express warranty, the plaintiff should not have to
rely on the representation in order to have it become part of the basis of the bargain.
Parties to a contract are generally bound by all of its terms, whether they read them or
not. They should therefore be entitled to take advantage of any beneficial provision
contained in the agreement.
180. The soundness of the position is questionable. Perhaps the case can be
analyzed by another theory. Section 2-316, which deals with the exclusion or modifica-
tion of warranties, provides that it is subject to the parol evidence rule contained in
section 2-202. Comment 2 to section 2-316 points out that the purpose of this rule is to
protect a seller from false allegations of oral warranties and from alleged warranties
given by unauthorized agents when the principal has limited the agents' authority in the
contract. Therefore, if the lease agreement in Stang was the complete and exclusive
statement of the parties' agreement, then the subsequent oral representation could not
have become part of the contract, and it would thus not have been part of the basis of
the bargain. Similarly, if the lease agreement contained a clause which provided that the
lessor's agent did not have authority to make warranties, then the unauthorized warranty
would not have been part of the lessor's contract, and hence, would have been unenforce-
able as to him. Yet the court found that the lease agreement itself was not part of the
basis of the bargain. See note 179 supra. Assuming the court was correct in its
conclusion that the plaintiff contracted to lease the car before receiving any express
warranty, it could have found that a vehicle with defective tires was not merchantable.
The plaintiff would then have been entitled to recover for breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314. See notes 206-10 &
accompanying text infra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
fact, that it related to the piece in question, and that it was made either
before or within a reasonable time after the contract was executed in
order to have it become part of the basis of his bargain. If the art
dealer merely proclaims that his pieces are all authentic, it is likely that a
court will not allow the representation to become part of the basis of the
bargain.
UCC section 2-316(1) allows the seller to disclaim express war-
ranties; however, it provides that
[w]ords or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
. . . negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonable.',
In Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., s2 the plaintiffs purchased
a painting listed in the catalogue as the work of Raoul Dufy. Several
years later, they learned that the picture was a forgery and sued to
rescind the contract. The plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased the
piece only because they believed it to be the work of the named artist, as
represented in the auction's catalogue. Parke-Bernet claimed this war-
ranty had been negated by the disclaimer printed in slightly smaller type
at the beginning of the catalogue.
The trial court found for the plaintiffs, stating:
Surely it is unrealistic to assume that people who bid at such auc-
tions will ordinarily understand that a gallery catalogue overwhelm-
ingly devoted to descriptions of works of art also includes on its
preliminary pages conditions of sale. Even less reasonable does
it seem to me to expect a bidder at such an auction to appreciate
the possibility that the conditions of sale would include a disclaimer
of liability for the accuracy of the basic information presented
throughout the catalogue in unqualified form with every appear-
ance of certainty and reliability.'1
8
On appeal, the judgment was reversed, the appellate court concluding,
in a brief per curiam opinion, that
[s]ince no element of a willful intent to deceive is remotely sug-
gested in the circumstances here present, the purchasers assumed
the risk that in judging the paintings as readily-identifiable, original
works of the named artist, and scaling their bids accordingly, they
might be mistaken. . .. They will not now be heard to complain
181. The omitted portion of this section refers to the parol evidence rule which is
designed to protect the seller from false allegations of oral warranties. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 2. See note 178 supra.
182. 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Civ. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 77 Misc. 80, 351
N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
183. 67 Misc. 2d at 101, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
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that, in failing to act with the caution of one in circumstances
abounding with signals of caveat emptor, they made a bad bar-
gain.
18 4
It is worth noting that the auction occurred before the UCC became
effective in New York; the case was tried under the Uniform Sales Act,
which did not have any provision dealing with disclaimers of express
warranties in contracts. 185 The court was therefore forced to rely on
common law doctrines of contract construction to interpret the disclai-
mer. On the other hand, the trial occurred in 1971, almost seven years
after the UCC was enacted in New York.186 Perhaps the trial judge
was influenced by the presence of the code even though the appellate
court was not. Had the case been brought under the UCC, a more
persuasive argument might have been made that the disclaimer should
have been inoperative. Comment 1 to section 2-316 points out that the
section is designed to protect buyers from unbargained-for and unex-
pected disclaimers of express warranties. The draftsmen apparently felt
that it was unreasonable to allow a seller to warrant goods expressly and
in the same agreement to negate that warranty. Yet even under the
code, the trier of facts must decide in each case whether the express
warranty and disclaimer can be construed in such a way as to be
consistent with each other.
Some state legislatures, recognizing these difficulties, have enacted
laws dealing specifically with art warranties. To supplement section 2-
313, the New York legislature approved a bill in 1966 which provides
that any art merchant who sells a work to a buyer who is not a merchant
creates an express warranty if, in describing the work, he identifies it
with an author or authorship. 18  It is recognized that the consumer
relies upon the art merchant's experience, education, and skill in desig-
nating pedigree. Therefore, the art dealer is prohibited by this law from
"fall[ing] back upon his 'built-in disclaimer'-that his attribution of
authorship was, after all, only his judgment.' 1 88  The art merchant
184. 77 Misc. 2d at 80-81, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
185. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Official Comment. See also Moss
v. Gardner, 228 Ark. 828, 310 S.W.2d 491 (1958). "The cases are uniform in holding
that . . . § 71 of the Uniform Sales Act allows parties to contract away and exclude
from their transaction all implied warranties under the Uniform Sales Act, and all
express warranties except those contained in the contract." Id. at 831, 310 S.W.2d at
492.
186. The UCC took effect in New York on September 27, 1964. See N.Y. U.C.C.
§§ 1-101 to 10-105 (McKinney 1964).
187. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw art. 12-D § 222 (McKinney 1966), as amended and
renumbered, § 219-c (McKinney Supp. 1975).
188. FELDMAN & WEIL, supra note 47, at 406.
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cannot avoid the legal sanctions for misrepresentations by alleging his
statement of authenticity was merely one of opinion, rather than one of
fact. He may not indulge in puffing to induce his buyer to purchase a
questionable work.18 9  The section also creates a presumption that
statements concerning authenticity become part of the basis of the
bargain.
Furthermore, to negate an express warranty of authenticity as to
the authorship of a work of art, a disclaimer must be in writing and
conspicuously set out in a separate provision "in words which would
clearly and specifically apprise the buyer that the seller assumes no risk,
liability or responsibility for the authenticity of the authorship ....
The New York General Business Law affords the purchaser greater
protection than UCC section 2-316(1) by providing that the express
disclaimer of warranty will be ineffectual if it is shown that the piece is
conterfeit or if
[t]he work of fine art is unqualifiedly stated to be the work of
a named author or authorship and it is proved that, as of the date
of sale or exchange, such statement was false, mistaken or errone-
ous.
19 1
Sections 219-b to 219-e of the New York General Business Law
are not penal provisions; rather, they are aimed at consumer protection.
They allow the purchaser to recover damages when he pays for an
authentic work of art and receives only a forgery.'92 Moreover, article
12-D provides for rescission if a sales catalogue states that a work is by a
named artist and it is discovered that it was done by a. student or
contemporary of that artist. Such works are to labeled "attributed to a
named author."' 93 Therefore, if the Weisz case had arisen under this
statute, the plaintiff would have been allowed to recover.
Michigan enacted a similar statute in 1970. 9' While the Michi-
gan and New York statutes go far in protecting the art consumer, they
do have some limitations worth noting. First, they apply only to
transactions between a merchant seller and a non-merchant purchas-
er.19 5 A merchant is defined by the Michigan law as
189. Id. at 177.
190. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 219-d(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
191. Id. § 219-d(3).
192. FELDMAN & WEIL, supra note 47, at 176.
193. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 219-c(2) (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
194. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. H9 442.321-.324 (West Supp. 1975).
195. Id. § 442.322(a); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-c (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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A person who deals in works of fine art or by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to works of fine
art or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
[The term "art merchant"] includes an auctioneer who sells works
of fine art at public auction as well as such auctioneer's consignor
or principal.
196
Whether a collector can be said to hold himself out as having such
knowledge or skill is unclear.191 Second, the statutes apply only to
written representations 9 ' and would presumably not affect oral state-
ments, which would still be governed by UCC section 2-313. Third,
the laws are effective only in New York and Michigan. An attempt to
enact a similar statute in Illinois was unsuccessful.' 99 One author
suggests that the reason for the Illinois legislature's failure to act was its
belief that the UCC adequately covered the situation. °00 As previously
discussed, section 2-313 leaves unanswered many questions concerning
art forgeries.
The code also provides for at least two20' implied warranties 0 2
196. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 442.321(a) (West Supp. 1975).
197. The collector is brought within the definition of "merchant" when he employs
an art merchant or auctioneer and when he consigns works of art to an auctioneer.
198. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 442.322(a) (West Supp. 1975); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
I.hw § 219-c (McKinney Supp. 1975).
199. See Art Legislation, supra note 9.
200. Id.
201. There is, however, another warranty implied in every sale of a work of art.
Section 2-312 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides for a warranty of title in every
contract for the sale of goods. This warranty is breached if the seller does not have
good title or lacks the right to convey the item in question. Thus, a stolen or looted
work of art would be subject to reclamation by its true owner, and its buyer would
presumably have a cause of action for breach of this warranty. The legal problems
generated by the international movement of looted works of art are very complex. In
United States v. McClain, No. 74-CR-191 (D. Tex., Aug. 14, 1975), the defendants were
convicted of interstate transportation of stolen goods. It appears that the defendants
had sold several pieces of prehispanic art to an undercover FBI agent in Texas.
Sometime before becoming involved in the ill-fated transaction, one of the defendants
had contacted the FBI and had been informed that the agency could see nothing wrong
with the arrangement. Id., Trial Record at 368, 581. Another defendant had embarked
on the enterprise only after receiving an opinion of counsel that no illegality would be
involved. Id., Trial Record at 568, 577-78. The appeal is currently pending in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. United States v. McClain, No. 75-
3368 (5th Cir., filed Sept. 4, 1975).
Another case is currently being litigated in three jurisdictions. In this situation
the defendants claim that they purchased good title to a bronze statue, known as the
Nataraja. When a newspaper article announced its location and the purchase price,
India demanded its return, asserting it was a national treasure which had been stolen.
See India v. Simon, Civil No. 74-3581 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 6, 1974); India v. Simon,
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which at least one writer believes may be available to an aggrieved
purchaser. 20 3  Section 2-314, titled "Implied Warranty of Merchantabil-
ity," states:
(1) Unless excluded or modified. . . a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
20 4
Paragraph (a) of section 2-314(2) provides that for goods to be
merchantable they must at least "pass without objection in the trade
under the contract description .... ,,205 Thus for a purchaser who
acquires from a dealer a forgery which has passed as authentic for some
time, this paragraph probably offers no remedy.
Paragraph (c) of the section indicates another test for merchanta-
bility. The goods must at least be "fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used ... -20 Comment 8 explains this para-
graph as requiring the goods to be "'honestly' resaleable in the normal
course of business because they are what they purport to be.'' 20  If the
work is discovered to be a forgery, it is not what it purports to be;
however, this paragraph is apparently limited to a purchaser buying for
resale rather than including the ulitmate consumer. 08  While the ar t
collector, who is not purchasing for resale, may be unable to rely on this
provision, the art investor might conceivably find a remedy under it.
Paragraph (f) of the section offers still another definition of
merchantability. It states that goods must at least "conform to the
promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
74 Civil No. 5331 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 5, 1974); India v. Plowden, 1974 I. No. 9308
(High Ct. of Justice, Q.B. Div., filed Dec. 6, 1974).
For a discussion of legal problems caused by the international movement of looted
works of art, see Gordon, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art
Treasures, 12 HARv. INT'L L.. 537 (1971); Rogers, The Legal Response to the Illicit
Movement of Cultural Property, 5 L. & POL. INT'L BUS. 932 (1973); Note, Protection of
Art in Transnational Law, 7 VARD. J. TR NSNAT'L L. 690-724 (1974). For a discussion
of the measure of damages for breach of warranty of title see Note, "Even in Death,
Hitler 'Lives,"' 4 ENT. L. 463 (1974). In addition, the UCC provides that "other
implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade." UNrIFORm
COMME Ar. CODE § 2-314(3).
202. U~noRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 (merchantability); id. § 2-315, (fitness
for particular purpose).
203. See note 150 supra.
204. UNrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
205. Id. § 2-314(2) (a).
206. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
207. Id. § 2-314, Comment 8.
208. The code provides: "protection, under this aspect of the warranty, of the
person buying for resale ... is equally necessary." Id.
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any."2 °9 If the work is signed or bears a descriptive plate on its frame,
it might be argued that to be merchantable, the item must have been
created by the named artist. This paragraph may afford the aggrieved
purchaser relief. It is limited, however, to situations in which the object
is signed or labeled and sold by a merchant dealing in goods of that
kind.210
The other implied warranty, that of "Fitness for Particular Pur-
pose," is found in section 2-315, which provides that
where the seller . .. has reason to know [of] any particular pur-
pose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
211
Comment 2 to this section defines "particular" purpose as specific and
peculiar to the nature of the buyer's business. The comment distin-
guishes "ordinary" purpose, which is governed by section 2-314.
When a collector acquires a work of art for aesthetic reasons alone,
section 2-315 has no application. Even if the piece is purchased only
because the buyer thinks it is authentic, and it is actually a forgery, the
section is inapplicable, since the purpose is ordinary.
It is only when a seller has reason to know that a piece is being
purchased specifically to complete a special collection or an object is
desired for some other specific purpose2 12 that section 2-315 appears to
be available. The buyer must rely on the seller's skill and judgment in
order to take advantage of this implied warranty. Comment 5 points
out that if the buyer insists on a particular brand, then he is not relying
on the seller's skill and judgment. Thus, it can be argued that the art
purchaser who, for example, desires a Faberg6 egg to complete his
collection is relying on the work's label rather than the dealer's skill and
judgment. This argument would fail if the article was "recommended
by the seller as adequate for the buyer's purposes. '"213
This discussion points out the marginal utility of the code's implied
warranties for the purchaser of a counterfeit work of art. In addition,
209. Id. § 2-314(2)(f).
210. Id. § 2-314(2). It should be noted that the definitions of merchantability
contained in the statute are merely illustrative; other possible attributes of merchantabili-
ty are intentionally left open. See id., Comment 6.
211. Id. § 2-315.
212. For example, the buyer may wish to donate an authentic Rodin sculpture to a
museum for study. If the piece is a forgery, the museum will probably reject the
donation, and the buyer's particular purpose will have been thwarted.
213. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, Comment 5.
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they are more easily disclaimed214 than express warranties and their
application to a transaction involving a spurious piece would present the
plaintiff with difficult problems of proof.
215
One form of art which has received special treatment by some state
legislatures is the fine print. To date, however, only Illinois216 and
California217 have enacted laws which are designed to police the fine
214. "Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states,
for example, that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the
face hereof."' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2).
Section 2-316(3) provides exceptions, including "all implied warranties are excluded
by expressions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty." Id. § 2-316(3) (a).
215. The evidentiary problems might prove insurmountable. The difficulty is
apparent when it is remembered that Van Meegeren was forced to create a forgery in jail
in order to convince the authorities that several "Vermeers" were really his work. See
note 14 & accompanying text supra.
216. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-%, § 361-69 (1975).
217. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1740-45 (West 1973). In 1975, Assemblyman Sieroty
proposed an amendment to the California statute. See A.B. 1054 (1975). He subse-
quently withdrew the amendment when artists' organizations expressed violent opposition
to some of the suggested changes. See Wayne, Comments on AB 1054, 1975 (unpub-
lished memorandum on file with the author); Sandison, AB 1054; Reply to June Wayne,
1975 (unpublished memorandum in Oregon Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts Library,
Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon).
Examination of the proposed changes is helpful, however, since they illustrate the
trend which legislation may be expected to take in this area of art law. Assembly bill
1054 expanded the scope of the existing act to include photographs, collages, and
sculptures, as well as fine prints. The value of works covered was raised to $50, framed
or unframed. The bill would have broadened the statute's disclosure provisions by
requiring the seller to disclose the source of information which is required to be given the
buyer under the statute. Presumably with this information, the prospective purchaser
could verify any questionable statements made by a dealer.
One of the most limiting features of the existing legislation is that it applies only to
prints made after the statute's enactment. A.B. 1054 would have broadened the existing
law by providing that all sales after its effective date would be covered.
The most heated aspect of the controversy was sparked by the new penalty
provisions. When the seller violated one disclosure requirement, the purchaser could
demand a refund at any time within two years. If the buyer could prove an intentional
violation, he could recover three times the purchase price, again at any time within two
years. If the purchaser were forced to sue to recover the refund, the court could award
attorneys' fees plus interest. Perhaps if the imposition of the, penalties had been
restricted to failure to disclose material facts, the critics would have been satisfied. Yet
the bill would have been substantially weaker, since it would have forced courts to decide
what was "material."
Beyond civil remedies, A.B. 1054 would have imposed criminal penalties for failure
to inform customers of their rights and for intentionally withholding information which
the seller had about the item to be sold.
In addition to this bill, the California legislature considered four other bills dealing
with art law. Two were not passed. See A.B. 1053 (1975) (requiring 1% of the cost of





The most impressive suggestion to reduce the possibility of a
purchaser being defrauded by acquiring a fake is the establishment of an
art registry. There are a variety of possible cataloging methods. Liv-
ing artists could file a certificate of authenticity, a photograph of the
work in question and the name of the first purchaser. The central file
could be patterned after the automobile licensing system. As an alter-
native, the artist could place his signature or distinctive design on the
creation, followed by a number of a special code impressed in a color of
the spectrum with a high atomic weight. Archives of the artists' designs
would be kept.21 A variation of this method would be to use the
artist's fingerprints on the painting, preserved by a chemical treatment.
One difficulty presented by this scheme is the reluctance of many
artists to become involved in what they consider bureaucratic control;
however, the registry would be as beneficial to the artists as to the
consumer. It would make their work more marketable by eliminating
forgeries, which tend to affect adversely the saleability of all art. Even
if some artists failed to cooperate, dealers or collectors could register
certain new buildings to be spent on art); A.B. 1391 (1975) (providing an artist with a
5% royalty on the subsequent resale of his creation). The legislature did approve the
remaining two, which became effective on January 1, 1976. See A.B. 1051 (1975)
(concerning common law copyright); A.B. 1052 (1975) (establishing an artist-dealer
fiduciary relationship). Mr. Joseph Rothman is currently circulating a draft for a fine
print bill which he hopes will be introduced into the 1976 New York Legislature. See
note 59 supra. See "An act to amend the general business law relating to deceptive acts
in the sale to consumers of fine print in limited edition; remedies," 12th draft, Jan. 1,
1976, Joseph Rothman.
218. There have been two unsuccessful attempts to enact federal laws to regulate
the fine print market. See H.R. 15578, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 15968, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Federal regulation would, of course, be the most effective
means of policing this market since, like the Indian handicraft trade, the fine print
market is nationwide.
219. For a suggested methodology, see Note, Legal Control of the Fabrication and
Marketing of Fake Painting, 24 STAN. L. REv. 930, 938 (1972). See also Turning the
Heat on Hot Art, ART NEws, Jan. 1976, at 20. The article announces that the
International Foundation for Art Research is undertaking a feasibility study under a
grant from the Jerome Foundation for the establishment of a registry of stolen art. Ms.
Bonnie Burnham, formerly Ethics of Acquisition Coordinator for the International
Council of Museums, will be coordinating this project. The article stated that cataloging
would be a problem since photographs would not always be available; therefore, the
system will probably be based on a number of descriptive features of the art object in
question.
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their authenticated works of art. The fingerprinting of art need not be
confined to contemporary artists. Works of art themselves possess
unique characteristics which may be identified;1 0 therefore, any work of
art-contemporary, old, or ancient-could be cataloged. The owner
could file a certified copy of the piece's certificate of authenticity with a
central registry.22'
In England, two bobbies developed a grid fingerprinting method
and incorporated it into an existing centralized file of art works known
as the International Art Registry. The registry itself is modeled after
Lloyd's Register of Shipping. A duplicate file is stored at Interpol
headquarters. 22
A bill which would have authorized the Smithsonian Institution to
found a repository for the voluntary recording of artists' certificates of
authenticity was placed before the United States Congress in 1966.223
The introduction of this bill by Congressman Jonathan B. Bingham, was
the first major step on the federal level.2 4 Unfortunately, it did not
pass, though the seed of the concept was planted.
In connection with the bicentennial celebration, the United States
government has recently established a registry for paintings created
during or before 1914.225 It is hoped that this catalog will expand in
scope after 1he 1976 celebration. If it does, it will not only reduce the
number of forgeries on the market but also decrease the incidence of art
theft, since stolen works would become virtually unsaleable.
The registry will be extremely costly and will take a long time to
220. For scientific methods of establishing authenticity see notes 43-114 & accom-
panying text supra.
221. This certificate should contain the arist's name if known, the title of the work,
the date and place of completion or approximate period, a description of the subject, the
materials and media used, a description of the method (stylistic or scientific) employed
by the expert(s) in authenticating the piece, the name(s) of the expert(s), a citation to
any published material about the piece, and any additional information which might aid
in identifying any unique characteristics of the work of arL This certificate should be
signed by the authenticating expert, if living, or certified by one who is familiar with the
work of the deceased expert. In addition, the certificate should identify the present
owner and location of the piece. In the event experts disagree on the authenticity of the
work of art, the conflict should be noted and the index should reflect the work's
questionable authenticity. Therefore, the only items not eligible for registration would
be unquestioned frauds.
222. L. ADAMs, ART CoP 57 (1973).
223. H.R. Res. 13446, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 5386 (1966).
224. See also Fake Art, supra note 6.
225. See Rocchia, Huge Art Inventory Launched, Oregon J., Feb. 7, 1975, § B, at 4,
col. 1. See also note 45 supra. Apparently, several eastern museums have already
begun to collect data on known works of art in a centralized computer.
1017May 19761
become functional if it is expanded by Congress. For the present, at
least, the buyer must rely on experts to authenticate works for him and
current law to redress any wrong. The existence of so many counterfeit
works of art, coupled with the inadequacy of the meager remedial
legislation, has frightened many would-be purchasers. 2 Until the
legislators recognize the problem and act accordingly, caveat emptor
must be the byword for the art purchaser.
Self-Policing
An alternative to legislation would be for the members of the art
community to police themselves. There have been some modest at-
tempts in this direction among French and American art dealers.227
A code of ethics formulated and enforced rigidly by the members
of the art-dealing community would be helpful in stemming the tide of
forgeries. Without a means of enforcement, however, such a code
would be of questionable value. Even if no code were formulated,
discussion of the issues and methods of self-regulation might be benefi-
cial, since the airing of differing viewpoints would assist dealers in
developing their own ethical standards. Moreover, a show of solidarity
by the dealers could help improve their image.
In France, a coalition of reputable museums and commercial art
galleries finances a group of legal and technical experts authorized to
track down and expose art dealers engaging in questionable practices.
2 28
The Art Dealers Association of America did consider forming a panel
of experts to determine the authenticity of works of art, but this idea was
never implemented, and no means of affirmatively seeking out the errant
art dealers exist in America.229
One method which could be effective for dealer self-policing is the
creation of a nongovernmental licensing association.23 9 Membership
should be available to any interested party, since a large organization
could keep dues low while providing many services. In addition, a
226. See, e.g., Goetze, Antique Collectors Cautioned by Couple about 'Investment'
Purchases, Oregonian, May 6, 1974, at 9, col. 1; see also Saxon, Anyone Here Want to
Buy a Rubens?, ESQUIRF, Jan., 1971, at 58.
227. See N.Y. Times, June 17, 1967, at 27, col. 1.
228. See Kuh, The Case of the Counterfeit Masterpieces, SAT. REV., Dec. 26, 1959,
at 27.
229. See N.Y. Times, June 17, 1967, at 27, col. 1. Contra Easby & Colin, supra
note 47.
230. Cf. ART LAW, supra note 45, at 309. Of course, governmental licensing would
be desirable; yet it would require legislation and implementation. It is not clear whether
dealers would favor or oppose government control.
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strong national or multinational organization with high visibility would
be able effectively to censure wayward members.23' Dealers could be
encouraged to publicize their affiliation, while the association could
advertise its goals and standards. These procedures would enable the
art-dealing community to clean its own house and thus aid the consum-
ing public. At present, the only means of determining whether a dealer
has engaged in shady practices is to contact the local Better Business
Bureau, the consumer protection division of the state's attorney general's
office, or the consumer fraud division of the local police department.
These agencies may disclose any past complaints upon which action
has been taken; however, many questionable practices go undetected.
Each dealer should utilize his own skills to prevent fraud. While
no one but the artist may authoritatively guarantee that *a work is
authentic, not all works which lack this form of authentication need be
labeled forgeries. The use of key phrases such as "from the school of,"
"in the manner of," or "attributed to," could alert a purchaser to the fact
that authorship is in doubt.232 When new information supplied by
more advanced methods of authentication casts doubt upon the prove-
nance of a work of art, a prospective buyer should be informed.
The New York Attorney General recognized the difficulty of hav-
ing a work of art authenticated and the significant existing potential for
fraud. He therefore urged the art community to create an organization
consisting of lawyers, scientists, art historians, and members of the
public interested in curtailing art fraud. The International Foundation
for Art Research was thus established. 2
33
It should be noted that an organization such as this one can be
even more dangerous than a corrupt dealer, since it possesses the aura of
231. It might be claimed that the Art Dealers Association of America is this very
organization. Id. Yet its main goal is not the disclosure of fraudulent practices and
corrupt dealers. Perhaps it could expand its present goals and formally adopt a code of
ethics as discussed above. This organization is apparently concerned with the ethics of
its members in some situations. See Glueck, Marlborough Is Expelled From Art Dealers
Group, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1975, at 13, col. 1, discussing the expulsion of Marlborough
Gallery from the association after "[tihe board decided that Marlborough, having been
publicly declared by a court of justice guilty of several charges of misconduct and having
been penalized accordingly, no longer meets the standards required for membership in
the association." Id. This action was taken after the decision in the Rothko case,
discussed in note 221 infra.
232. In fact, several auction houses have instituted a practice of not only utilizing
these terms, but defining them in the sales catalogue. See, e.g., Sotheby Parke Bernet,
Los Angeles, Auction Catalog, Oct. 28, 1974, Glossary.
233. See Arnason, Introducing the International Foundation for Art Research,
MusEum NEws, Apr. 1972, at 28.
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impartiality and scholarship. Unfortunately, the organization's internal
procedures are secret, and it has been involved in some questionable
practices. In one case, the foundation announced that it had tested a
sculpture by subjecting it and a known ancient terracotta Ushabti to an
ultraviolet examination.23 4  The conclusion of the unidentified founda-
tion expert was that since the flourescence produced by the two pieces
was different, the sample was a forgery.23 5 This result is dubious. The
sculpture in question was carved from limestone 36 and therefore is not
likely to react the same way as terracotta. 23 7  In addition, leading
authorities have stated, "The value of ultraviolet examinations of lime-
stone has never been demonstrated in any publication as far as we can
ascertain.
238
It is hoped that the attorney general will recognize the danger of
secrecy when money or power are involved and will cause the founda-
tion to change its techniques. Attorney General Lefkowitz has been
extremely active in policing nonprofit corporations239 which affect the
public interest.24 When the Museum of the American Indian Heye
Foundation was believed to be involved in some unlawful endeavors, a
234. See Rosenbaum, IFAR: Art Attributions for Art History's Sake, ART IN
AMERICA, Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 25.
235. Id.
236. Hay, Report on 2 Sculptures from Tel-EI-Amarna, Feb. 10, 1975 (unpub-
lished).
237. Rorimer, Utraviolet Rays and Their Use in the Examination of Works of Art,
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (1931).
238. Stross & Eisenlord, A Report on a Group of Limestone Carvings Owned by M.
A. Mansoor and Sons (1965) (unpublished report on file with Oregon Volunteer
Lawyers for the Arts, Inc., Portland, Oregon).
239. This diligence is quite unusual since there appear to be only four attorneys
general actively fulfilling their statutory mandate and protecting the public interest by
policing nonprofit corporations or public trusts. See Office of the Attorney General,
Ohio Attorney General's Report to the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public
Needs, Dec. 28, 1974. An interesting question raised by this state of affairs is whether
members of the public have standing to enforce public trust purposes and the fiduciary
duties of those in control of the entity absent some special injury. Thus far the courts
have been reluctant to allow this type of suit, although a recent article suggests that the
field may be opening up, at least when the plaintiffs are within the class intended to be
benefited by the public trust or charitable corporation. See Berry & Buchwald, Enforce-
ment of College Trustees' Fiduciary Duties: Students and the Problem of Standing, 9
U.S.F.L. REv. 1 (1974).
240. The New York statute provides that the attorney general shall represent the
beneficiaries of such dispositions for religious, charitable, educational, or benevolent
purposes and that it shall be his duty to enforce the rights of such beneficiaries by
appropriate proceedings in the courts. N.Y. EST., Powas & TRUSTS LAw § 8-1.1(f)
(McKinney 1967).
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suit was brought to correct the problem.2 4' It is hoped that a similar
process will cure the difficulties of the International Foundation for Art
Research.
Conclusion
During the past decade, governmental officials, concerned citizens,
and progressive members of the bar have focused interest on the plight
of the consumer. This attention has resulted in a wave of protective
legislation designed to aid aggrieved consumers. In addition, the courts
have begun to lean toward this form of protection. While some jurisdic-
tions have acknowledged the parallel problem faced by the art purchaser
and have taken steps to remedy it, the effort has been modest and is by
no means universal. It is hoped that consumer protection will be
extended to the art market and be effectively applied to reduce the
incidents of art fraud.
241. See Lefkowitz v. Museum of the Am. Indian Heye Foundation, Petition for a
Compulsory Accounting, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1st Dept., filed June 27, 1975); Stipulation File
No. 41416/75, entered Aug. 27, 1975. See also Estate of Mark Rothko, in N.Y. Times,
Dec. 22, 1975, at 10, col. 4. In Rothko the New York Attorney General intervened on
behalf of the Mark Rothko foundation in an action commenced by the heirs of Mark
Rothko against the trustees of his estate and the Marlborough Galleries. The court held
the three trustees liable for breaching their fiduciary duty to the estate and Marlborough
liable for receiving excessive commissions. Id. See also Glueek, The Man the Art World
Loves to Hate, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 12, col. 1.
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